Corrected version — 23 August 2026

This replaces the version of Submission 6 lodged in June 2026. It incorporates 87 corrections identified by a verification review completed on 23 August 2026, in which every quotation was matched by exact string comparison against the primary source documents.

A schedule of every correction, showing the text as originally lodged beside the corrected text and its source, is published alongside this document as the Notice of Corrections. A marked-up version showing each change in place is also available, so that nothing can have been altered without record.

The review did not extend to every reference in the submission. What was checked and what remains unverified is stated in the Notice of Corrections.

Submission 6

A Comparative Analysis of the Australian Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism

Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion

Robert Vose, June 2026

This submission provides the empirical evidential foundation for Submission 7: Holocaust Memory Should Restrain State Power, Not Legitimise Its Expansion.

Summary of Findings

Finding 1 — Systematic divergence from the peer corpus. The Segal Plan diverges from a comparison corpus of 34 peer documents from 31 countries and international bodies — national antisemitism strategies, envoy reports, and special coordinator documents — the direct international analogues of the Segal Plan itself — in five analytically significant categories: mandatory IHRA adoption, visa screening for views, funding conditionality, campus enforcement machinery, and the absence of any free speech safeguard attaching to those enforcement measures. In each category the Plan goes beyond the international consensus position taken by comparable envoy and coordinator bodies in the same direction: toward coercive compliance and state enforcement.

Finding 2 — Consistent direction of divergence. The divergence is not random. In every category, the Segal Plan converts the peer consensus approach — voluntary adoption, positive funding, educational engagement, and explicit speech protection — into a compliance or enforcement mechanism: mandatory adoption, funding withdrawal, regulatory report cards, immigration screening, and individual grant termination. The direction of divergence is consistent across all five dimensions.

Finding 3 — Correspondence with a contested US policy model. The Segal Plan's distinctive provisions correspond structurally to a series of US policy instruments developed between 2007 and 2025, rather than to the European peer consensus the Special Envoy identifies as her source. The Plan does not acknowledge this correspondence. The US instruments in question are themselves the subject of ongoing legal and political contestation.

Finding 4 — Institutional context warrants examination. The procurement arrangements surrounding the Segal Plan — including a non-tendered strategic communications contract with a firm whose relevant interests and connections warrant examination — may provide relevant institutional context for the divergence documented in this submission. The Commission is well-placed to examine this context before finalising recommendations.

Note to the Commission — Verification Requested

This submission is presented to assist the Royal Commission in determining the matters within its Terms of Reference. The comparative evidence base — 34 peer documents from 31 countries and international bodies — has been assembled and processed in good faith to help the Commission assess whether the Segal Plan reflects international norms and to inform its findings and recommendations.

References to source documents, including document title and page number, are supplied throughout this submission for every factual claim made. The Commission is respectfully asked to verify those claims against the cited sources before relying on them in findings or recommendations. The evidence base was constructed using automated extraction and AI-assisted translation, which introduce the possibility of error. The submitter accepts responsibility for the analytical conclusions drawn from the evidence; the Commission should satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the underlying facts by reference to the citations provided.

Part 1: Purpose and Scope

This submission is the evidential companion to Submission 7 to this Commission (Holocaust Memory Should Restrain State Power, Not Legitimise Its Expansion). Submission 7 makes the constitutional and philosophical argument. This submission — Submission 6 — provides the empirical foundation on which that argument rests.

The specific question this submission addresses is: does the Segal Plan reflect international norms, or does it represent a significant outlier? If it is an outlier — and this submission documents that it is, in multiple analytically significant categories — a further question arises: what explains the divergence? This submission does not propose what the Commission should recommend in place of the Segal Plan; that is a matter for the Commission. It provides the comparative evidence on which the Commission can assess whether the Segal Plan's distinctive provisions warrant adoption.

This submission addresses both questions using direct evidence from the Neo4j graph evidence base built for this project. Every factual claim in this submission traces to a specific node in that graph, which in turn traces to a source document in the submission evidence archive. No claim is made that is not backed by a citable document in the evidence graph.

Part 2: Methodology

The Comparative Corpus

The evidence base for this submission is a Neo4j graph database containing envoy reports, parliamentary documents, legislation, case law, and submissions from 31 countries and international bodies. The corpus includes envoy reports from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Council of Europe, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, the European Union, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, OSCE/ODIHR, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States.

The Classification System

Each Segal Plan recommendation is classified against peer evidence using the following criteria:

• FALSE — A specific factual claim in the Segal text is directly contradicted by peer evidence: for example, a claim that a particular practice is universal when the peer corpus shows it is contested.
• OVERSTATED — Australia's position goes significantly further than the international median; fewer than 25% of peer countries have an equivalent provision.
• CONTESTED — The peer corpus is significantly split, or Australian constitutional jurisprudence creates domestic contestation around the provision.
• ALIGNED — Consistent with international norms; ≥60% of peer countries have a similar provision.

The Peer Consensus Threshold

A recommendation is recorded as having peer consensus where 3 or more distinct countries address the same policy category. The country count is displayed for each recommendation so the threshold is transparent and challengeable.

Direct Quotes Only

All peer quotes in this submission have been checked by exact string match against the text of the source documents themselves. Two qualifications apply. First, quotations from the eight machine-translated sources (Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland — see section 3.1) are automated translations not verified by a human translator, and are marked where used. Second, minor typographic differences introduced by PDF text extraction have been normalised. Quotations found to be inaccurate on review are struck through and corrected in place; see the Correction Register at the end of this document. The evidence graph contains 8045 nodes and 14341 relationships as of the date of this submission.

Part 3: Where the Segal Plan Diverges from Its Peers

3.1 Source Documents — Comparison Corpus

The following table lists all source documents in the comparison corpus, ordered by country. Three text-status categories apply:

• English (original) — the document was published in English and is used directly.
• Official English version — the document was published in another language but the issuing government also published an authoritative English translation. The official English version is the text used in this submission; it is cited as authoritative.
• AI translation — no official English version exists. Recommendations were extracted and translated using Qwen 2.5 (7B) running locally via Ollama. The graph stores both the verbatim original-language text ( text_original ) and the English translation ( text_en ). Any party wishing to verify a translation may compare the text_original field against the source PDF at the URL provided. Source PDFs are preserved in the evidence archive provided to the Commission on request. Translations have not been independently verified by a human translator.

3.2 The Divergence — Five Key Dimensions

The following table summarises the five areas where the Segal Plan's recommendations diverge most significantly from the positions taken by the 34 comparable national antisemitism envoy reports, action plans, and special rapporteur documents that form the comparison corpus. All peer quotations are drawn verbatim from the Neo4j graph; citations are to the source document node. The table is ordered from most to least divergent. Part 4 examines the institutional context in detail.

Reading the table. "Peer consensus" means the position taken by the majority of peer countries that addressed this category. "Segal Plan position" is drawn from the plan's text. The verdict follows the classification methodology in Part 2: OVERSTATED means fewer than 25% of peers have an equivalent; CONTESTED means significant split or explicit constitutional contestation in the peer corpus; ALIGNED means ≥ 60% of peers take a comparable position.

3.3 The Dual-Track Enforcement Architecture

The five divergences in section 3.2 share an underlying structural logic. The Segal Plan does not merely prefer stronger anti-antisemitism measures than its peers — it deploys a dual-track enforcement architecture that is largely without parallel in the 34-document comparison corpus. Understanding this architecture is essential to understanding why the Plan's recommendations are structurally different, not merely more emphatic.

Track 1: Criminalisation

Where the criminal law can reach, the Segal Plan proposes to extend prosecutorial discretion by training police, prosecutors, and the judiciary through IHRA-informed definitional guidance:

"The Envoy will develop guidance for, and ensure comprehensive education is provided to, police, prosecutors, the judiciary and regulatory authorities so that the application of the law is informed by a thorough understanding of antisemitism."

— Segal Plan, p.6

The mechanism is indirect but precise: by training the investigators and prosecutors who exercise discretion over whether a borderline case is pursued, the Plan shapes criminal outcomes without changing the criminal law itself. The IHRA definition's eleven illustrative examples — which include conduct such as "denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination" — are thereby imported into the prosecutorial calculus for public-order and hate-speech cases. The UK experience documented in section 2 of the contextual discussion (Part 4 below) illustrates the trajectory this enables.

The US Guidelines — the only peer to explicitly address the law enforcement framing — specify that enforcement "should take place within legal frameworks that protect civil liberties and human rights, such as freedom of expression" (United States, Global Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism, 2024, p.1). The Segal Plan contains no equivalent safeguard attaching to its law enforcement recommendations; its single reference to freedom of expression (p.11) is confined to cultural funding.

Track 2: Funding conditionality

Where the criminal law cannot directly reach — university research programs, arts funding, cultural institutions — the Segal Plan proposes a separate enforcement mechanism: the withholding or termination of public funding. The key recommendations:

"The Envoy will work with government to enable government funding to be withheld, where possible, from universities, programs or individuals within universities that facilitate, enable or fail to act against antisemitism. Working with government and grant authorities, the Envoy will, where possible, establish that all public grants provided to university centres, academics or researchers can be subject to termination where the recipient engages in antisemitic or otherwise discriminatory or hateful speech or actions."

— Segal Plan, p.9

"Include terms in all public funding agreements with cultural institutions or festivals to allow for the efficient termination of funding where the institution or festival promotes, facilitates or does not deal effectively with hate or antisemitism."

— Segal Plan, p.11

Three features of this mechanism are structurally distinctive and require scrutiny:

• The liability trigger is institutional inaction. Funding is not merely withheld from institutions that commit acts of antisemitism. It is withheld from institutions that "fail to act against" antisemitism — an affirmative obligation to police speech and conduct according to a standard set by the Envoy's office, not by statute. This effectively conscripts university administrations into a surveillance and enforcement role as a condition of receiving public funds.
• Liability extends to individuals. Grants to "university centres, academics or researchers" can be "subject to termination" for speech or conduct assessed as antisemitic. Individual researchers' careers and projects become contingent on compliance with an extra-legal definitional standard. No peer jurisdiction in the 34-document corpus applies funding conditionality to individual researchers.
• The scope extends across civil society. The mechanism applies to cultural institutions, festivals, artists, broadcasters, and individuals — wherever public funding flows. The Segal Plan proposes that funding agreements across the entire publicly-funded cultural sector include termination clauses tied to antisemitism compliance.

The "fail to act" standard as a chilling mechanism

The phrase "fail to act against antisemitism" is not legally defined in the Segal Plan. Combined with a contested, non-legally-binding definition of antisemitism (IHRA), and enforced through the Envoy's "report card" mechanism, it creates an enforcement apparatus with no clear bright line. Institutions cannot know in advance what conduct crosses the threshold. The rational institutional response — as any compliance lawyer would advise — is to suppress borderline speech pre-emptively. That is precisely what a chilling effect looks like in practice.

The chilling-effect concern is not a theoretical objection. Amnesty International Australia, in a statement of July 2025 annexed at p.217 of the Wertheim expert statement bundle, stated:

"Chillingly the plan sets forth recommendations to defund schools, universities, charities, media outlets and cultural institutions that 'facilitate, enable or fall foul against antisemitism,' meaning funding could be contingent on refraining from criticism of the Israeli Government."

— Amnesty International Australia, July 2025, annexed at p.217 of the Expert Statement bundle of Peter Wertheim (STAT.8999.0049.00100217)

The submission as lodged attributed this passage to Mr Wertheim himself, and reasoned that the Plan's own institutional advocate had characterised its funding mechanism this way. That reasoning was wrong and is withdrawn in full. The passage is the view of a human rights organisation critical of the Plan, not of the peak body that supported it, and it carries the weight of external criticism only.

Independent scholarship on the IHRA definition supports this concern. Professor David Feldman, Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Study of Antisemitism (University of London), has warned that forcing adoption of the IHRA definition will produce "a chilling impact on students, on academic and professional staff and on institutions dedicated to debate and robust discussion" that will be "corrosive and long lasting." Feldman has characterised the IHRA definition as "confusing and divisive" and described advocacy bodies' use of it as "a tool to stifle free speech" and "a threat to legitimate protest."

Professor David Feldman, Director, Birkbeck Institute for the Study of Antisemitism, public statements reported in The Jewish Chronicle and Middle East Monitor, 2020–2021. See also: bisa.bbk.ac.uk

Peer comparison: funding conditionality is not the international norm

Of the 34 peer documents, one — Austria — uses a funding termination mechanism. Austria's clause is narrow and explicit: the Austrian Development Agency's standard contracts may be terminated for "incitement activities, such as antisemitism" — a criminal-law standard, not an extra-legal definitional standard (Austria, Nationale Strategie 2.0, 2025, p.193).

Italy — the peer closest to the Segal Plan on institutional IHRA adoption — requires universities to include IHRA "in the codes of ethics" of instructors, but explicitly qualifies this "with respect for freedom in teaching and research" and links the obligation to "principles of equality, inclusion and pluralism" (Italy, Strategia Nazionale, 2025, p.25). Segal contains no equivalent qualification.

Hungary — the only peer to examine IHRA's applicability to freedom of expression law — concluded through a formal ministerial review that the existing legislation provides adequate safeguards for combating hate speech and hate crime (Hungary, National Strategy Against Antisemitism, 2024, p.10), leaving no funding conditionality gap to fill.

The international norm, across all 34 peer documents, is to fund positively — to provide grants for education, community security, Holocaust remembrance, and interfaith dialogue — not to condition existing funding on antisemitism compliance. The Segal Plan's funding conditionality mechanism has no meaningful international precedent.

No review mechanism — the enforcement loop is closed

The dual-track architecture has a third structural feature that compounds both tracks: there is no independent review, appeals process, tribunal, or ombudsman at any point in the enforcement loop. This omission is not incidental — it is structural.

The enforcement chain runs as follows. The Envoy's office establishes the definition of antisemitism. The Envoy's office trains police, prosecutors, and university administrators in its application. The Envoy's office publishes the university "report card" — its own assessment of whether each institution has sufficiently "implemented effective practices and standards to combat antisemitism" (Segal Plan, p.9). An adverse report card finding then triggers the funding conditionality mechanism. The same office that defines the standard, trains the assessors, and publishes the report card is the office that advocates to government for funding withdrawal. There is no separation between investigator, adjudicator, and complainant. The loop is closed.

An institution or individual whose funding is terminated — or whose grant is assessed as termination-eligible — has one recourse: self-funded court action. In Australian administrative law, this means either a judicial review application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (where a statutory decision exists) or a constitutional challenge grounded in the implied freedom of political communication (Lange v ABC [1997] HCA 25; Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43). Both pathways are costly, slow, and uncertain. Neither provides a stay of the funding termination while the challenge proceeds. For an arts organisation, cultural festival, university research centre, or individual academic, loss of public funding is frequently not survivable as a going concern. The legal remedy arrives, if at all, after the damage is done.

The funding asymmetry — who can afford to resist

The absence of a review mechanism is not experienced symmetrically. The institutional capacity to challenge a funding termination, sustain litigation against the Commonwealth, and maintain operations during a legal dispute is not equally distributed between the parties that the enforcement architecture creates.

The Australian Government's own response to the Segal Plan documents the funding position of the peak body that advocated for the Plan:

"[The Government is] providing and extending the Executive Council of Australian Jewry with $159.5 million in funding, in collaboration with the Community Security Groups and the National Council for Jewish Community Security to improve safety and security at Jewish community sites, including synagogues, and to protect Jewish students in schools and higher education."

— Australia, Eliminating Antisemitism: Australian Government Response to the Segal Plan (2025), p.7

This is in addition to Peter Wertheim's evidence that ECAJ sought a further $25 million in urgent security funding in October 2023 (Wertheim, Expert Statement, p.31).

Set against this: the entities most likely to be subject to the funding conditionality mechanism — Palestinian community organisations, pro-Palestinian cultural bodies, academic research centres publishing peer-reviewed work on Israel-Palestine, individual researchers whose grant conduct is assessed as antisemitic under the Envoy's report card — have no comparable institutional funding base, no equivalent government-funded legal support structure, and no statutory access to a funded review body. The enforcement mechanism, structured without a review process, operates in an environment where one category of institutional actor has overwhelming resources to initiate and sustain enforcement actions, and another has few or none to resist them.

This asymmetry is not addressed anywhere in the Segal Plan. It is not mentioned in the Australian Government's response to the Plan. It is, however, the predictable structural consequence of combining an unreviewed enforcement mechanism with a pre-existing, government-funded disparity in organisational capacity between the parties on either side of that mechanism.

The asymmetry is further compounded by the dynamic funding position of the two sides. The organisations that designed and advocate for the Segal Plan have a demonstrated capacity to obtain additional government funding on request — ECAJ's October 2023 application for $25 million in urgent security funding is one documented instance (Wertheim Expert Statement, p.31). The Commission should consider whether the proposed enforcement architecture operates asymmetrically, given the documented government funding available to some institutional advocates of the Plan and the absence of any equivalent funded review mechanism for the entities most likely to be subject to enforcement action.

By contrast, the Segal Plan specifically proposes to subject the overseas funding of its potential enforcement targets to intelligence-level investigation:

"The Envoy will advocate to continue to have the appropriate authorities investigate sources of overseas funding entering public institutions, including universities, which might drive extreme ideologies."

— Segal Plan, p.9

"A dedicated judicial inquiry should be undertaken to address systemic issues, including the investigation of foreign sources of funding for antisemitic activities and academics at universities."

— Segal Plan, p.9

The structure is as follows. If an institution appears on the Envoy's adverse report card, it faces: (1) domestic public funding termination; and (2) investigation of its overseas funding sources by "appropriate authorities." The institutional advocate of the enforcement framework, meanwhile, has access to substantial domestic government funding and faces no equivalent scrutiny of its own overseas funding under the Plan's provisions. This is not a symmetrical enforcement environment. It is a structure in which one party's resource base is protected and expandable, and the other's is subject to contraction from multiple directions simultaneously — with no review mechanism to contest any of it.

Peer comparison: review mechanisms are the norm where conditionality exists

Of the 34 peer documents, none adopts a funding conditionality mechanism without accompanying accountability structures. Austria's narrow ADA termination clause sits within existing contract law and is subject to standard civil litigation on equal terms. The Council of Europe's ECRI Recommendation No. 9 (Revised, 2021) — the most widely cited international instrument on anti-antisemitism policy among peer jurisdictions — consistently emphasises proportionality and procedural safeguards as conditions of any enforcement action. No peer jurisdiction creates an enforcement mechanism equivalent to the Segal Plan's closed loop: envoy-defined standard → envoy-published report card → government funding withdrawal → self-funded court challenge only.

The Pattern

The divergence is not random. In each of the five dimensions above, and in the dual-track enforcement architecture documented in section 3.3, the Segal Plan takes the peer consensus position — voluntary adoption, positive funding, educational engagement, speech protection — and converts it into a compliance or enforcement mechanism: mandatory adoption, funding withdrawal, regulatory report cards, immigration screening, individual grant termination. The direction of divergence is consistent across every category, and the architecture that connects them is consistent too: extend state coercive power wherever the law permits it; substitute funding conditionality where it does not.

Part 4 of this submission examines whether the structural environment in which the Segal Plan was produced offers an explanation for this systematic divergence.

3.4 The Special Envoy's Claim of International Alignment — Assessed Against the Evidence

In her oral evidence to this Commission on Day 4 (7 May 2026), Special Envoy Jillian Segal AO made two specific claims about the international grounding of her Plan:

"The global guidelines are a very important document because they set out a framework for countering antisemitism and they informed the development of my plan."

— Ms Segal AO, RC Hearing Transcript Day 4, 7 May 2026, p.85

"I looked at other plans, particularly the plan in Germany which is quite similar, and the European Commission plan."

— Ms Segal AO, RC Hearing Transcript Day 4, 7 May 2026, p.90

A third factual claim from the same passage of evidence is also verifiable from the documentary record. Explaining why the US plan was longer than hers, the Special Envoy stated:

"The US plan ran to 200 pages because it was every part of the constitution was dealt with."

— Ms Segal AO, RC Hearing Transcript Day 4, 7 May 2026, p.90

The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (May 2023) — the document in the comparison corpus — is 60 pages. It is not an exhaustive constitutional survey; it is a policy strategy comparable in structure to the German and Australian plans. The Global Guidelines document that the Special Envoy identifies as having "informed the development of my plan" and that she attached as Annexure B to her statement (Exhibit 1-069) is 3 pages.

All three factual claims — that the Global Guidelines informed the distinctive provisions of her Plan, that Germany's plan is "quite similar," and that the US plan ran to 200 pages — are contradicted by the primary sources. The Commission should treat the Special Envoy's international comparisons with corresponding caution.

The comparative corpus does include one document of comparable length (233 pages): the Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 published by Austria in 2025 (233 pages). Austria, the most detailed peer document in the corpus, contains the most explicit warning about definitional overreach: the IHRA working definition "should not be used to restrict expressions of opinion through political instrumentalization" (Austria, Nationale Strategie 2.0, 2025, p.47 — machine translation from the German, not verified by a human translator). The Segal Plan does not mention Austria's strategy.

All three claims are directly testable against the 34-document comparative corpus assembled for this submission. The evidence does not support them.

3.4.1 The Global Guidelines do not contain the Segal Plan's distinctive provisions

The Global Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism (July 2024, attached as Annexure B to the Special Envoy's statement, Exhibit 1-069) is a three-page aspirational framework signed by special envoys and national coordinators from participating states. It identifies seven generic action categories: adopt and implement strategies; appoint and empower national coordinators; combat online antisemitism; address antisemitism in education; support Jewish communities; hold perpetrators accountable; and strengthen international collaboration.

The Global Guidelines contain no provision corresponding to any of the five key divergences identified in section 3.2 of this submission:

• No recommendation for mandatory IHRA adoption across government and universities. The Guidelines refer to IHRA only as "an important internationally recognized instrument" — language that is advisory, not mandatory.
• No recommendation for funding withdrawal from universities or cultural institutions that "fail to act against antisemitism." The Guidelines encourage positive funding for Jewish life; they do not propose withdrawal as a compliance mechanism.
• No recommendation for visa screening of applicants for antisemitic views or affiliations. The Guidelines make no reference to immigration policy.
• No recommendation for media monitoring by the envoy to ensure editorial impartiality and accuracy on antisemitism-related reporting.
• No recommendation for campus enforcement machinery — report cards, regulatory action, or commission of inquiry triggered by university non-compliance.

The Global Guidelines are consistent with the peer consensus documented throughout this submission: voluntary frameworks, positive programs, and educational engagement. The Segal Plan's distinctive provisions — which depart from that consensus — cannot be traced to the Global Guidelines that the Special Envoy identifies as their source.

3.4.2 Germany's plan is not "quite similar" to the Segal Plan

The Special Envoy specifically identified Germany's national strategy as "quite similar" to her Plan. Germany's Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und für jüdisches Leben (NASAS, 2022) is one of the most detailed peer documents in the comparison corpus. On every dimension where the Segal Plan diverges from international norms, Germany takes the opposing position:

The German plan and the Segal Plan share a common starting point — the recognition that antisemitism is a serious and growing problem requiring coordinated government response. Beyond that starting point, the structural approach diverges fundamentally: Germany uses positive incentives, voluntary frameworks, and educational engagement; the Segal Plan uses mandatory compliance, funding conditionality, regulatory enforcement, and ideological screening at the border.

The claim that these are "quite similar" is not supported by the text of either document. The Commission should weigh the Special Envoy's oral characterisation of international alignment against the documentary record assembled in this submission, which is drawn directly from the source documents she identifies as her comparators.

3.5 Project Esther: The Undisclosed Comparator

Note on scope. Project Esther is not one of the 34 national envoy or coordinator documents in the peer comparison corpus used throughout this submission. It is a Heritage Foundation publication — a US conservative think-tank document linked to the Project 2025 policy agenda — and is not a government strategy or a product of the international antisemitism envoy network. It is included here for a specific and limited purpose: to show that the structural architecture of the Segal Plan — the provisions that depart most sharply from the European mainstream — has a clear analogue in the Heritage Foundation document, not in the European peer consensus the Special Envoy identifies as her source.

Project Esther: A National Strategy to Combat Antisemitism was published by the Heritage Foundation on 7 October 2024 — months before the Segal Plan. It is a 33-page document produced by a National Task Force convened by Heritage as part of the broader Project 2025 policy programme. It treats pro-Palestinian advocacy as an organised "Hamas Support Network" (HSN) and proposes dismantling that network through a coordinated campaign of defunding, campus enforcement, social media suppression, visa removal, and "name and shame" operations.

The document is explicit about its architecture. It sets out a hierarchy of End States (ES), Desired Effects (DE), and Necessary Conditions (NC) — a military-style campaign planning structure.

The eight parallel passages below place the Segal Plan and Project Esther side by side. The language differs — Project Esther names its targets explicitly as a "Hamas Support Network"; the Segal Plan uses the administrative vocabulary of compliance and accountability. The enforcement architecture in each pair is structurally parallel.

Match Assessment — 7 thematic categories (category 8 withdrawn on review)

6 /7 DIRECT closely corresponding mechanism

1 /7 STRUCTURAL same goal, PE more explicit

0 /7 NO MATCH every retained category has a parallel

No peer document matches more than one of the seven retained categories below, and none matches the architecture as a whole. Two peers match a single category each: Austria (category 5) and Italy (category 1). Project Esther matches all seven.

[DIRECT] 1. Mandatory definitional standard

Segal Plan — p. 6

"The Australian government should require consistent application and adoption of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism across all levels of government, public institutions and regulatory bodies." (p.6)

"The Envoy will work with state and federal governments to require the IHRA working definition of antisemitism to be used across all levels of government and public institutions to inform their practical understanding of antisemitism." (p.6)

"The Envoy will publish a supplementary guide to the IHRA definition (an IHRA Handbook), which will assist in its application in an Australian context." (p.6)

↔

Project Esther — pp. 3, 7, 19, 22

ES1 (p.19) "HSO propaganda eradicated from the U.S. education system at all levels."

NC2 (p.22) "HSO propaganda is not academically accreditable."

DOC2 (p.7) "Those supporters of Palestine and Hamas who have claimed for decades that criticizing Israel's policies does not equate to antisemitism are at best insincere. They have simply masked their antisemitism in a thin veneer of political rhetoric to disguise their true intent — the destruction of the Jewish state of Israel."

DOC1 (p.3, Executive Summary) "The virulently anti-Israel, anti-Zionist, and anti-American groups comprising the so-called pro-Palestinian movement… are exclusively pro-Palestine and — more so — pro-Hamas. They are part of a highly organized, global Hamas Support Network (HSN) and therefore effectively a terrorist support network."

Both documents treat a mandatory definitional standard as the mechanism for categorising non-compliant content as propaganda. Project Esther states the doctrine explicitly — anti-Zionism equals Hamas support. Mandatory IHRA adoption creates structurally analogous conditions: the IHRA illustrative examples classify some anti-Zionist speech as potentially antisemitic, which under a mandatory compliance framework produces the same categorisation effect that Project Esther achieves through explicit definitional declaration.

[DIRECT] 2. Removal of campus staff and students

Segal Plan — p. 12

"All members of the university community — including staff, students, and visitors — who promote antisemitic rhetoric or harass Jewish students or academics must be held accountable."

↔

Project Esther — pp. 12–13, 21–22

DE2 (p.21) "HSO-supporting faculty and/or staff removed or fired."

NC4 (p.22) "HSO-supporting faculty and staff's credibility undermined."

NC5 (p.22) "HSO-supporting faculty and staff lose their credentials."

DOC3 (pp.12–13) "Canary Mission had documented that at least 856 professors at over 240 universities across 46 states… had openly advocated or supported up to 63 different HSOs [pro-Palestinian organisations]."

Both documents target individuals, not just institutional policies. Both require professional consequences. Both leave the definition of the proscribed conduct to an external authority. Canary Mission's professor database is the US equivalent of the Segal report card: a public accountability mechanism directed at individual academics.

[DIRECT] 3. Campus enforcement machinery

Segal Plan — p. 9

"The Envoy will develop and launch a university report card, assessing each university's implementation of effective practices and standards to combat antisemitism, including complaints systems and best practice policies, as well as consideration of whether the campus/online environment is conducive to Jewish students and staff participating actively and equally in university life." (p.9)

"A commission of inquiry into campus antisemitism, including the sources of funding for organised clusters of antisemitism, should be commissioned by the Federal Government if systemic problems remain in universities by the start of the 2026 academic year." (p.9)

"Working with the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency the Envoy will advocate to ensure that systemic action is taken to reverse a dangerous trajectory of normalised antisemitism in many university courses and campuses." (p.9)

↔

Project Esther — pp. 10, 21–22, 28

DE3 (p.21) "HSO access to campuses lost and/or denied."

NC6–NC7 (p.22) "HSOs in violation of campus policies." / "HSOs lose affiliation with campuses."

ACT3 (p.28) "We must conduct audits, both academic and financial. We must conduct information campaigns that are designed to illuminate and expose — 'name and shame' — to undermine HSN and HSO members' credibility. We must wage lawfare."

DOC6 (p.10) "The U.S. education system fosters antisemitism under the guise of 'pro-Palestinian,' anti-Israel, anti-Zionist narratives across universities… often under the umbrella or within the rubric of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and similar Marxist ideology."

Project Esther's "academic audits" and "lawfare" correspond directly to Segal's commission of inquiry. Both treat DEI and pro-Palestinian campus organising as the institutional problem to be reversed. Canary Mission's public professor database performs the same function as the Segal report card.

[DIRECT] 4. Foreign funding investigation

Segal Plan — p. 9

"The Envoy will advocate to continue to have the appropriate authorities investigate sources of overseas funding entering public institutions, including universities, which might drive extreme ideologies." (p.9)

"Should significant problems remain at universities by the start of the 2026 academic year, as assessed by the Envoy's report card, a dedicated judicial inquiry should be undertaken to address systemic issues, including the investigation of foreign sources of funding for antisemitic activities and academics at universities." (p.9)

↔

Project Esther — pp. 13, 21–22, 28

DOC4 (p.13) "Foreign money from wealthy supporters of the Palestinian cause flows freely into U.S. academic institutions as a way to influence curricula against Israel and Jews… The largest donor was Qatar ($2.693 billion from 2014–2019), which currently serves as Hamas's proxy in ongoing negotiations to release Israeli hostages."

DE5 (p.21) "Money from foreign HSO supporters not accepted by schools."

NC13 (p.22) "Institutions voluntarily refuse money from HSO supporters."

ACT7 (p.28) Investigate "the extent of foreign influence over the hearts and minds of American youth."

Near-identical framing: overseas money ideologically corrupts universities. Project Esther names Qatar by dollar amount; Segal uses "extreme ideologies." Same mechanism — official investigation leading to funding exclusion — same presumption that foreign philanthropy is a vector for contamination rather than legitimate academic exchange.

Evidentiary note: no Australian data supports this concern.

Project Esther's foreign funding claim rests on US Section 117 of the Higher Education Act, which requires American universities to disclose foreign gifts and contracts above $250,000. The figures cited — Qatar's $2.693 billion to US universities from 2014–2019, Cornell's $1.5 billion from Qatar since 2015 — are drawn from that US-specific federal disclosure register. No equivalent funding pattern exists in the Australian data.

Australia's disclosure mechanism for foreign influence on universities is the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS Act 2018), administered by the Attorney-General's Department. The FITS public register is searchable at transparency.ag.gov.au. A parliamentary review of the scheme noted "with concern the low number of registrations and minimal compliance and enforcement activity during the six years since the scheme was established" — a finding consistent with the absence of the large-scale coordinated foreign funding of campus advocacy that the Segal recommendation implies.

The Segal Plan does not cite any Australian data source — not the FITS register, not Department of Education reporting, not ARC disclosures — to substantiate the claim that overseas funding is driving "extreme ideologies" in Australian universities. It cites no specific donor, no institution, no amount, and no documented instance of the mechanism it proposes to investigate. The recommendation is transposed directly from the Project Esther and Project 2025 context, where US-specific Section 117 data exists, into an Australian context where no equivalent evidence has been produced.

The Commission may wish to request that the Envoy identify the specific Australian evidence base for this recommendation before it is adopted as policy. In the absence of such evidence, the foreign funding investigation mechanism represents the importation of a US policy instrument into a jurisdiction where the factual predicate for that instrument has not been established.

[DIRECT] 5. Funding conditionality

Segal Plan — pp. 9, 11

"The Envoy will work with government to enable government funding to be withheld, where possible, from universities, programs or individuals within universities that facilitate, enable or fail to act against antisemitism." (p.9)

"Include terms in all public funding agreements with cultural institutions or festivals to allow for the efficient termination of funding where the institution or festival promotes, facilitates or does not deal effectively with hate or antisemitism." (p.11)

↔

Project Esther — pp. 19, 21, 23

ES4 (p.19) "HSOs no longer have access to the U.S. economy."

NC12 (p.22) "HSOs not eligible for public funds."

NC14 (p.23) "Institutions cease providing money to HSOs."

NC16 (p.23) "HSOs not permitted to make money."

DE6 (p.21) "HSOs unable to raise revenue."

Closely corresponding economic-exclusion mechanism. Project Esther targets "HSOs"; the Segal Plan targets institutions or individuals that "fail to act." Both use economic exclusion as the primary compliance lever. "Fail to act" is as open-ended as "HSO-supporting": both vest discretionary enforcement power in the implementing authority, with no defined threshold for compliance.

[DIRECT] 6. Visa and migration restrictions

Segal Plan — p. 13

"Screen visa applicants for antisemitic views or affiliations, consistent with a risk-based approach." (p.13)

"Ensure the Migration Act (and associated decision-making and review processes) effectively facilitates visa refusals or cancellations for antisemitic conduct and rhetoric." (p.13)

"Provide antisemitism training to staff within the Department of Home Affairs and all those involved in processing visa applications." (p.13)

↔

Project Esther — pp. 21–22

NC8 (p.22) "HSO members in violation of student visa requirements."

NC9 (p.22) "HSO-supporting foreign faculty and staff in violation of visa requirements."

NC10 (p.22) "Foreign HSO leaders and members voluntarily depart the U.S."

NC11 (p.22) "Foreign HSO leaders and members deported from the U.S."

DE4 (p.21) "Foreign members of HSOs/HSN access to campuses lost and/or denied."

DE16 (p.21) "Foreign HSO leadership no longer present in U.S."

Six Project Esther provisions map directly onto three Segal recommendations. Both use immigration law as the enforcement mechanism for speech and association. Project Esther is explicit about deportation (NC11); the Segal Plan's visa cancellation mechanism achieves the same outcome. Both specifically target foreign students and faculty — the most legally vulnerable population on any campus.

[STRUCTURAL] 7. Media and social media monitoring

Segal Plan — p. 8

"The Envoy will monitor media organisations to encourage accurate, fair and responsible reporting and assist them to meet their editorial standards and commitment to impartiality and balance and to avoid accepting false or distorted narratives." (p.8)

"The Envoy will establish a project to support trusted voices to publicly refute antisemitic views, particularly via social media platforms." (p.8)

↔

Project Esther — pp. 21, 23, 27–28

DE10 (p.21) "Social media no longer allow the spread of antisemitic content."

NC20–NC21 (p.23) "Social media view HSOs' presence as a liability." / "Social media platforms unwilling to host or promote HSOs."

ACT4 (p.28) "We must conduct information campaigns that are designed to illuminate and expose — 'name and shame' — to undermine HSN and HSO members' credibility."

ACT5 (p.28) "We must disrupt HSN and HSO communications, both to the broader public and among each other."

ACT6 (p.27) "We have access to the same social media platforms across the entire U.S. digital ecosystem. These allow us… to access and monitor the HSN's."

Project Esther is more aggressive (explicit disruption, platform bans). The Segal Plan uses softer language (monitoring, "encouraging" editorial standards). The goal is the same: suppress content deemed antisemitic and counter pro-Palestinian narratives. "Trusted voices" (Segal) performs the same counter-messaging function as "name and shame" (PE) — differing in tone, not in kind.

[STRUCTURAL] 8. Online surveillance infrastructure

Segal Plan — p. 7

"The Envoy will advocate to state and federal governments to consider a permanent standing cooperation arrangement to investigate incidents and threats, as well as links to terrorist elements." (p.10)

↔

Project Esther — pp. 19, 23–24, 27

ACT1 (p.24) "We will assume a network-centered approach to gain a comprehensive understanding of the infrastructure that sustains the individuals and organizations supporting Hamas… conduct both center of gravity (COG) analysis and social network analysis (SNA) to identify critical vulnerabilities."

ACT6 (p.27) "We have access to the same social media platforms across the entire U.S. digital ecosystem. These allow us… to access and monitor the HSN's."

ES7 (p.19) "HSOs' communications disrupted."

NC28 (p.23) "Critical vulnerabilities identified."

No parallel is drawn. The Segal Plan's cooperation arrangement is directed at incidents, threats and terrorist links, and is not an online monitoring instrument.

The pattern across the seven retained dimensions is the same: each Segal Plan provision that diverges from the European peer consensus has a structural equivalent in Project Esther. The language differs — Project Esther is explicit that its targets are pro-Palestinian advocacy organisations it labels a "Hamas Support Network"; the Segal Plan uses the administrative language of compliance, report cards, and "failing to act" — but the enforcement architecture is identical. Both documents identify the same problem (organised pro-Palestinian activity on campuses and in media), target the same institutions (universities, cultural bodies, social media platforms), and propose the same response (defunding, removal, monitoring, and immigration consequences).

The European peer consensus documented in sections 3.1–3.2 of this submission takes none of these positions. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the EU, Sweden, and Austria — the states that appear most frequently in international antisemitism policy coordination — rely on voluntary frameworks, positive funding, and educational engagement. None propose funding withdrawal tied to definitional compliance. None propose visa screening for ideological views. None propose media monitoring by government or envoy. None propose campus report cards or regulatory inquiry mechanisms. The Project Esther framework does all of these things, and so does the Segal Plan.

The Commission is not asked to make a finding about the provenance of the Segal Plan. It is asked to assess whether the Segal Plan's recommendations are proportionate, consistent with human rights principles, and aligned with effective international practice. The analysis above shows that the provisions of the Segal Plan that diverge most sharply from the European mainstream are, structurally, the provisions that most closely track the Project Esther framework — a document produced by a US conservative think-tank that explicitly treats pro-Palestinian advocacy as "effectively a terrorist support network."

Non-disclosure of a material comparator

The Segal Plan annexes a comparative review drawing on 32 international jurisdictions. Project Esther is not among them. This omission is material for three reasons.

First, scope. Project Esther is the primary United States policy document on combating antisemitism at the time the Segal Plan was prepared. The Segal Plan nonetheless cites a US document — the US National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism — as precedent for a 200-page plan, when that Strategy is 60 pages and shares none of the enforcement mechanisms listed above. Project Esther is 33 pages and corresponds directly to six of the seven retained categories.

Second, provenance. Where the Segal Plan's recommendations diverge from the 34-document peer corpus — mandatory definitional enforcement, funding conditionality tied to compliance, visa screening for ideological views, campus report cards, foreign funding investigations, and permanent online monitoring bodies — they correspond precisely to Project Esther's End States, Desired Effects, and Necessary Conditions. The convergence is not incidental: it is structural, provision-by-provision, as the mirror analysis above demonstrates.

Third, character of the omitted document. Project Esther is not a mainstream government policy paper. It categorises all pro-Palestinian campus advocacy as "effectively a terrorist support network" and recommends that its members be deported, defunded, and subjected to social network analysis to identify "critical vulnerabilities." Citing it openly would require the Segal Plan to disclose that its novel enforcement architecture derives from a document that treats political speech as terrorism — a characterisation that no peer government in the 35-country corpus endorses.

The Commission may wish to consider whether Project Esther — the document whose enforcement architecture most closely corresponds to the Segal Plan's novel recommendations — was a material comparator that should have been disclosed or addressed in any comparative account of the Plan's policy origins.

3.6 The Nexus Project: A Jewish-led Critique of Project Esther

The Nexus Project is a US-based research initiative directed by Jewish scholars and civil society leaders. Its foundational documents — the Nexus Document (2021) and Nexus White Paper (2020) — propose an alternative definition of antisemitism grounded in the distinction between legitimate criticism of Israeli policy and genuine anti-Jewish hatred. In March 2025 the Nexus Project published Fighting Antisemitism, Protecting Democracy: A Strategy for the Trump Era, which addressed Project Esther directly. Its critique is significant because it comes from within the Jewish community and from scholars who accept that antisemitism is a serious problem requiring active response.

On Project Esther's campus enforcement model:

"The Heritage Foundation's 'Project Esther' and President Trump's Executive Order on 'Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism' seek to stifle voices on campus by casting a vast net to identify and potentially sanction those who don't hold to a pro-Netanyahu view of Israeli policy."

— Nexus Project, Fighting Antisemitism, Protecting Democracy, p.12 (March 2025)

On the historical pattern of university suppression:

"All concerned citizens should be alarmed by the plans underway. History reveals that imposing draconian restrictions on universities — whether in Nazi Germany, Communist Russia, or fascist South America — is a classic move by anti-democratic regimes, which subsequently weaponize these policies to serve their own nefarious interests."

— Nexus Project, Fighting Antisemitism, Protecting Democracy, p.12 (March 2025)

On deportation as an antisemitism enforcement tool:

"When the Trump administration speaks of cracking down on antisemitism, it speaks of going after those who protest or criticize Israel, particularly on college and university campuses, and threatening to deport students on visas if he deems them to be 'Hamas sympathizers.'"

— Nexus Project, Fighting Antisemitism, Protecting Democracy, p.6 (March 2025)

On the instrumentalisation of Jewish pain:

"We are being used. Our pain, our trauma, is being exploited to eviscerate the dream of a multiracial democracy, while advancing the goal of a white Christian nation."

— Nexus Project, Fighting Antisemitism, Protecting Democracy, p.8 (March 2025)

On antisemitism enforcement as pretext:

"Work in coalition to prohibit antisemitism from being used as a pretext to deport people for engaging in free assembly or free speech."

— Nexus Project, Fighting Antisemitism, Protecting Democracy, p.2 (March 2025)

Each of these criticisms applies with equal force to the corresponding Segal Plan recommendations. The Nexus Project explicitly names the use of antisemitism enforcement as a mechanism to suppress political speech, identifies deportation of visa-holders as a targeted instrument against the most legally vulnerable campus population, and warns against the institutional architecture — precisely the "permanent bodies" and campus report cards — that Project Esther and the Segal Plan both propose.

The Nexus Project is not a pro-Palestinian advocacy group. It is a Jewish-led research initiative that accepts antisemitism is real and harmful, and that has developed its own definition framework precisely to protect the integrity of that claim against political instrumentalisation. Its assessment of Project Esther is that the document exploits the language of antisemitism to advance a political agenda that damages Jewish safety by associating it with the suppression of democratic rights.

3.7 The Intellectual Lineage: From a 2007 Law Review Article to the Segal Plan

The enforcement architecture in the Segal Plan did not emerge from the 34-document peer corpus cited in its comparative annex. It can be traced through a documented sequence of US policy instruments, each building directly on the last, over an 18-year period. A single figure — Kenneth L. Marcus — is the common thread through most of this lineage.

Note on Australian constitutional context and the regulatory transplant problem.

The enforcement architecture documented in this lineage was designed for the United States constitutional environment, where the First Amendment provides an express guarantee of freedom of expression. That guarantee has constrained implementation: US courts have struck down or limited aspects of the EO 13899 and EO 14188 framework on First Amendment grounds, and the Canary Mission professor blacklist has attracted litigation. The Project Esther authors acknowledge this constraint when they describe the need to "wage lawfare" rather than rely on direct prohibition.

Australia has no equivalent express guarantee. The implied freedom of political communication recognised in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 operates as a structural limit on legislative power — not an individual right — and is considerably narrower in scope. It applies only to governmental action affecting political communication, does not protect all political speech, and cannot be raised against non-state enforcement mechanisms such as funding conditionality administered through contract terms.

The practical consequence is significant: the Segal Plan proposes importing an enforcement architecture that is constrained in its country of origin by constitutional guarantees that do not exist in Australia. The result would be a stronger version of the Project Esther framework than the US itself can lawfully implement.

Australian conditional funding precedents. Australia does have an existing framework for conditioning university funding on compliance. The Higher Education Support Act 2003 (HESA) allows Commonwealth grants to be reduced or repayment required for breach of "quality and accountability requirements." The Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) may impose registration conditions on providers and take enforcement action for non-compliance. Universities could in principle lose access to HESA funding as a last-resort sanction for serious non-compliance with governance and quality standards.

However, the existing Australian framework conditions funding on viewpoint-neutral criteria: governance standards, financial accountability, student support obligations, quality of teaching and assessment. No Australian funding instrument has ever conditioned access to public funds on ideological compliance — on whether an institution uses a specified definition of a contested term, or whether it has acted against particular categories of speech or association. The Segal Plan would extend the existing HESA/TEQSA conditionality mechanism to viewpoint-specific ideological compliance for the first time in Australian higher education history — using, as its template, a US enforcement architecture designed for a constitutional environment with stronger speech protections than Australia possesses.

None of the 31 peer countries in the comparative corpus reviewed in section 3.1–3.2 of this submission conditions university funding on IHRA adoption or on action against specific categories of campus speech. The proposed extension is without international precedent in liberal democracies.

Step 1 — The legal foundation (2007)

Kenneth L. Marcus, "Anti-Zionism as Racism: Campus Anti-Semitism and the Civil Rights Act of 1964", William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 837–891 (2007).

Available: scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss3/4/ | brandeiscenter.com (2024 update)

Marcus, then a civil rights enforcement official under President George W. Bush, published the foundational legal argument that anti-Zionism constitutes racial discrimination against Jews cognisable under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The article argued that federal agencies were legally obliged to treat anti-Zionist campus speech as potentially unlawful discrimination, and that conditioning federal educational funding on the suppression of such speech did not violate the First Amendment — relying on Grove City College v. Bell 458 US 554 (1984) for the proposition that "Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept." This is the legal theory that makes Segal's funding conditionality mechanism viable.

Step 2 — The institutional vehicle (2011)

Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law, founded by Kenneth Marcus, Washington DC, 2011.

Available: brandeiscenter.com

Marcus established the Brandeis Center as the institutional vehicle to litigate and advocate for the legal framework developed in his 2007 article. The Centre pioneered the use of Title VI complaints against universities to compel action on pro-Palestinian campus speech, developed best-practice guidance for university administrators, and produced the FAQ document on defining antisemitism that prefigures the Segal Plan's IHRA Handbook proposal.

Brandeis Center FAQ on defining antisemitism (2022): brandeiscenter.com — FAQs About Defining Anti-Semitism

Step 3 — The first executive order (2019)

Executive Order 13899 — Combating Anti-Semitism, signed by President Donald Trump, 11 December 2019. Marcus was serving as Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights (head of the Office for Civil Rights, US Department of Education) at the time.

Available: trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov

Department of Education Q&A on implementation: ed.gov — Q&A on EO 13899

EO 13899 was the first federal instrument to mandate that agencies consider the IHRA working definition when enforcing Title VI. Marcus administered this order as OCR head. His 2007 legal article is the direct intellectual source: the order operationalises Grove City's funding conditionality principle and the anti-Zionism-as-racism argument simultaneously. EO 13899 is the precise model for the Segal Plan's mandatory IHRA adoption recommendation.

Step 4 — The university grading model (2024)

ADL Campus Antisemitism Report Card (Beta), Anti-Defamation League, published April 2024, updated March 2025.

Available: adl.org/campus-antisemitism-report-card | PDF (March 2025)

The ADL's report card grades US universities across three domains — administrative policies, campus conduct and climate, and Jewish life — The document does not itself link grading outcomes to federal funding; that connection is made by the executive orders at Steps 3 and 6 below. The Segal Plan's university report card mechanism adopts this structure directly: administrative policies, IHRA compliance, and complaints handling are its stated criteria. The ADL report card was published ten months before the Segal Plan was submitted to the Commission.

Step 5 — The policy framework (October 2024)

Project Esther: A National Strategy to Combat Antisemitism, The Heritage Foundation, 7 October 2024.

Available: heritage.org — Project Esther PDF | heritage.org — report page

Project Esther, published as a companion to Project 2025's Mandate for Leadership (PDF, 920pp), codifies the Marcus legal framework into a full enforcement architecture: mandatory IHRA adoption, campus purges of "HSO-supporting" faculty, foreign funding investigations, social network analysis of pro-Palestinian organising, visa revocations and deportations, platform bans, and economic exclusion. As the mirror analysis in section 3.5 demonstrates, six of the seven retained enforcement mechanisms in the Segal Plan correspond directly to Project Esther provisions. Project Esther was published four months before the Segal Plan was submitted to this Commission.

Step 6 — The second executive order (January 2025)

Executive Order 14188 — Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism, signed by President Donald Trump, 29 January 2025.

Available: whitehouse.gov

EO 14188 reaffirmed EO 13899 and directed all federal agencies to identify civil and criminal authorities that "might be used to curb or combat anti-Semitism," with specific instructions to "investigate and punish anti-Jewish racism in leftist, anti-American colleges and universities." It was signed three weeks before the Segal Plan submission date. EO 14188 demonstrates that the enforcement architecture in Project Esther was actively being implemented at the federal level at precisely the time the Segal Plan was being finalised.

Step 7 — The counter-strategy (March 2025)

Nexus Project, "Fighting Antisemitism, Protecting Democracy: A Strategy for the Trump Era", March 2025.

Available: nexusproject.us | Nexus briefing on Project Esther: nexusproject.us/nexus-resources/project-esther-a-nexus-project-briefing/

The Jewish-led Nexus Project published its counter-strategy the month after the Segal Plan was submitted. Its assessment of Project Esther — that it "seeks to stifle voices on campus by casting a vast net to identify and potentially sanction those who don't hold to a pro-Netanyahu view of Israeli policy" — applies with equal force to the Segal Plan provisions that mirror it. The Nexus counter-strategy demonstrates that the lineage described above is not a fringe or marginal interpretation: it is the subject of active, substantive debate within the Jewish community itself.

Summary: The Marcus lineage.

Kenneth L. Marcus wrote the foundational legal argument in 2007. He founded the institutional vehicle (Brandeis Center) in 2011. He administered EO 13899 as OCR head in 2019. His legal framework is the jurisprudential basis for the ADL Report Card (2024), Project Esther (2024), and EO 14188 (2025). The Segal Plan adopts an enforcement architecture closely corresponding to the framework Marcus spent 18 years constructing. The Plan does not acknowledge this policy lineage, its US political context, or the substantial Jewish-led critique that has been directed at it.

The Biden Administration's National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (May 2023, PDF) — the document cited by the Special Envoy as the US precedent, though she misstated its length as 200 pages — takes a fundamentally different approach: it emphasises positive education, cross-community solidarity, and voluntary frameworks. It contains none of the mandatory enforcement, funding conditionality, or surveillance mechanisms that appear in both Project Esther and the Segal Plan. The US document identified by the Special Envoy as the comparator for her Plan employs different mechanisms from those the Plan proposes.

Finding: A foreign enforcement architecture not identified in the peer corpus.

The Commission's terms of reference direct it to consider approaches to combating antisemitism "consistent with Australian values and human rights obligations." The lineage analysis above is directly responsive to that question.

The novel enforcement provisions of the Segal Plan — mandatory IHRA adoption, funding conditionality tied to definitional compliance, university report cards administered by the Envoy's office, campus inquiries into foreign funding, visa screening for ideological views, and permanent online monitoring bodies — do not derive from Australian policy tradition, from the European peer consensus documented in sections 3.1–3.2 of this submission, or from any government policy adopted by a peer liberal democracy. They correspond closely to a sequence of US conservative policy instruments developed between 2007 and 2024 by a single institutional network centred on Kenneth L. Marcus and the Heritage Foundation.

The distinctive provisions of the Segal Plan do not reflect shared international best practice transmitted through comparative policy channels. The lineage analysis above demonstrates that they correspond to a sequence of US policy instruments that are themselves the subject of ongoing legal and political contestation — including active constitutional challenge in the United States, where the First Amendment constrains their implementation. Australia's implied freedom of political communication is narrower in scope, which means that adoption of the same framework in Australia would produce effects that its US architects cannot lawfully achieve at home.

No peer country among the 31 examined in this submission — not Germany, not France, not the United Kingdom, not the European Union, not Canada — has adopted the mechanisms the Segal Plan proposes. The only jurisdiction that has moved toward implementation of these mechanisms is the United States, under executive orders signed in January 2025. The Segal Plan was submitted to this Commission in February 2025 — one month later.

The Commission may consider whether recommendations that have no precedent in Australian law, no parallel in any peer liberal democracy, and a documented correspondence with a US policy document published by the Heritage Foundation four months before the Segal Plan's submission date are appropriately described as deriving from international comparative analysis — and whether their adoption would be consistent with Australia's human rights obligations and its tradition of viewpoint-neutral public administration.

Part 4: The Institutional Context — A Possible Explanation for the Divergence

Framing note. This section documents a structural relationship between the procurement environment surrounding the Segal Plan and the Plan's documented divergence from international norms. No finding of misconduct is asserted. No wrongdoing is alleged. What is recorded is a pattern of institutional connection that is consistent with the observed divergence and that the Commission is well-placed to examine. This section draws on public reporting, Senate Estimates Hansard (27–28 May 2026), and Submission 7 RC Sub. 7 — Holocaust Memory Should Restrain State Power, June 2026 to this Commission.

4.1 The Procurement Chain

The Department of Home Affairs entered into a contract for "public affairs and strategic communications services" with Society Advisory Pty Ltd without a competitive tender process, to support the work of Special Envoy Jillian Segal. The confirmed contract value is $200,000, running until April 2027 — covering the entire period of the Royal Commission's final report. Society Advisory was founded by Yaron Finkelstein. Before founding Society Advisory, Finkelstein served as Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister Scott Morrison (2018–2022). Before entering the Morrison government, Finkelstein spent more than thirteen years at CT Group (formerly Crosby Textor), where he rose to Australian CEO and then Global Head of Campaigns.

The publicly confirmed scope of the $200,000 contract is significant. It covers: "drafting and reviewing submissions, preparing briefing materials for the witness appearances and providing advice and support on media engagement and public discourse." (Senate Estimates Hansard, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, 27 May 2026, p.63 — evidence of a Home Affairs official.) This means Finkelstein — a former Liberal Party political strategist and CT Group alumnus — was engaged to draft submissions and prepare briefing materials for witness appearances before the Royal Commission itself. The structural concern this creates is not about Finkelstein's personal background or identity. It is about function: a person whose professional career was built on political intelligence, messaging strategy, and campaign operations for the Liberal Party and CT Group was contracted to shape what witnesses said when they appeared before a Royal Commission — a body whose findings will inform legislation affecting civil liberties and university governance. The procurement concern is compounded by the direct connection between CT Group's institutional network and the political environment that produced this Commission.

At Senate Estimates on 27 May 2026, Independent Senator David Pocock questioned senior Home Affairs officials about the absence of competitive tender. Senator Watt, representing the Minister, stated: "The department have already pointed out that the special envoy will be providing evidence, and I think it's appropriate that she explain the basis of that decision." Department Secretary Stephanie Foster gave evidence that "this has been entered into by the special envoy for antisemitism". Ms Foster gave the rationale recorded under the procurement rules: "It was for highly specialised, non-replicable expertise in public affairs and strategic communications or sensitive issues which only Society Advisory can provide." Senator Pocock observed that Home Affairs has 105 people in its own communications team, and stated: "I guess that confirms some of what I think are very valid questions that Australians have about our procurement system, where it seems to be a lot more about who you know than expertise. I just don't understand why something like this for $200,000, when you've got 105 people on your comms team…"

Segal appeared at Senate Estimates on Thursday 28 May 2026 and confirmed her personal arrangement of the contract. The full Hansard of her appearance should be read alongside this submission; the published record confirmed the $200,000 figure and her personal direction of the engagement. (Sources: The Guardian; The Canberra Times, 27 May 2026; Crikey, 27 May 2026; Senate Estimates Hansard, 27–28 May 2026, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee.)

4.2 CT Group: The Lineage

CT Group (Crosby Textor Group) is not simply a political polling and campaign firm. It combines three distinct business functions: political strategy and polling; commercial client representation across government-adjacent industries; and a corporate intelligence arm staffed by former intelligence and security operatives. According to 2023 investigative reporting by David Hardaker in Crikey ("Spooks and spies: Crosby Textor moves into shadowy territory", 1 June 2023), CT Group's intelligence personnel have included Daniel Hoffman, a former CIA station chief who describes himself as a "senior executive clandestine services officer." CT Group's own website confirms it offers an "Intelligence" service line.

CT Group's documented political client history includes: the Liberal Party of Australia across multiple election cycles; the UK Conservative Party (Boris Johnson's 2019 campaign); and a Washington lobbying presence through its American entity, CTF Global LLC, which Crikey reported "has acted as a lobbyist for General Dynamics and Centrus Energy since it set up shop in Washington in 2018". General Dynamics is the lead contractor for the US Navy's nuclear-powered submarine fleet; its subsidiary Electric Boat is prime contractor and joint builder of the Virginia-class submarines, with Huntington Ingalls Industries (Crikey, 31 May 2023). In 2023, Mark Textor served as a strategic adviser to the Yes23 Voice to Parliament referendum campaign.

In February 2024, the Financial Times reported that CT Group had been accused in two separate UK High Court litigations of supplying banking records that opposing parties alleged were forged. In both cases CT Group had been engaged by law firm Mishcon de Reya. In the second litigation, banking documents purporting to show €125 million in transactions controlled by the claimant were put in issue; EFG Bank, Banque Lombard Odier, BGL BNP Paribas, Barclays Bank (Monaco) and Julius Baer Bank (Monaco) each confirmed they held no accounts linked to her. CT Group denied wrongdoing and maintained the information it provided was genuine and obtained lawfully. In Linda May Green v CT Group Holdings Limited [2023] EWHC 3168 (Comm) (Charles Hollander KC, 11 December 2023) the court accepted there was "a good arguable case of forgery" in respect of the documents, but expressly held: "I do not consider that the evidence before the court demonstrates wrongdoing or improper behaviour by CT Group." The claimant's application was dismissed. No court has made any finding that CT Group forged documents, and the Commission is asked to note the court's express statement in the firm's favour. The Commission is not asked to make any finding on this question. It is noted solely because the allegation — which concerns document provenance, source opacity, and contested evidentiary reliability in the context of CT Group's corporate intelligence work — bears on the due diligence any government procurement process should apply before engaging a firm with this institutional profile to shape national policy communications.

The combination of cross-jurisdictional conservative government lobbying, defence industry representation, intelligence-sector personnel (as publicly reported), and the conduct allegations documented above is, of itself, a structural matter warranting disclosure and due diligence before any Commission of this significance relied upon work product from a firm with this profile.

4.3 Jillian Segal: The Structural Position

Segal served as President of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) from November 2019 to November 2023, and as Immediate Past President thereafter — a formal office-holder role within the peak Australian Jewish advocacy body, constitutionally pro-Israel in its orientation. She simultaneously served as Chair of the Australia Israel Chamber of Commerce (NSW) until March 2025. In May 2021, speaking as ECAJ President, Segal declared: "The Australian Jewish community and its representative bodies stand with Israel and will always stand with Israel."

Jillian Segal AO (ECAJ President), Address at NSW Rally for Peace and Solidarity with Israel, May 2021. Published: ecaj.org.au/ecaj-president-jillian-segal-aos-address-at-nsws-rally-for-peace-and-solidarity-with-israel/

In this capacity, Segal is simultaneously: the government's principal antisemitism policy architect; the author of the Plan the Commission was established to assess and implement; the person who directed the Society Advisory contract; and an unscrutinised witness before the Commission. Questioned by Senator Shoebridge at Senate Estimates on 28 May 2026, Segal stated "I did. I declared all my interests," and said her interests "were well known" because of her prior board positions. She confirmed she had been consulted about, and supported, the refusal to release her interest forms, on the basis that under the guidelines "they are private information," and took on notice what had been refused. The forms are the subject of a freedom of information request that was treated as a deemed refusal and is on appeal to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. Their content has not been made public.

4.4 The Advocacy Network: ECAJ, AIJAC and the CAHE–RC Pipeline

The Commission is receiving evidence from the same advocacy coalition that designed the January 2026 hate speech legislation at the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) inquiry into the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism (CAHE) Bill. The Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ), the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), and the Special Envoy's Office were each active at CAHE; they are each active before this Commission. Understanding what those bodies advocated for at CAHE — and what they achieved — is relevant to assessing the weight the Commission should place on their evidence here.

ECAJ — Mandatory mechanisms and expanded symbols

At CAHE, ECAJ welcomed the shift to an objective test for racial vilification (removing the need to prove intent) and pushed for recognition of cumulative harm — the principle that a pattern of incidents, each individually minor, collectively constitutes vilification. ECAJ also advocated for an expanded prohibited symbols framework, specifically seeking inclusion of Hamas-associated imagery such as the inverted red triangle. Its submission characterised the existing regulatory environment as one of "relative impunity" and argued that "experience has shown that iterations of laws seeking to proscribe hate speech have proven ineffective." ECAJ, PJCIS Sub. 124, CAHE Bill inquiry, 2026 Each of these positions appears, in structural form, within the Segal Plan's enforcement recommendations. ECAJ's CEO, Peter Wertheim, subsequently provided an expert statement to this Commission running to 242 passages Exhibit 1-036, RC Sydney Hearings, 2026.

AIJAC — Advocacy for Muslim organisation designation under the CAHE Bill

AIJAC's CAHE submission is notable for what it reveals about the dual-use intent of the legislation. While framed as antisemitism protection, AIJAC explicitly used the submission to seek the designation of Muslim organisations under the new prohibited hate groups framework: "AIJAC hopes more groups, including the local branches of radical Islamist organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir … and Ahl As-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah (ASWJ), will also be designated under the new hate group framework." AIJAC, PJCIS Sub. 96, CAHE Bill inquiry, 2026

This is significant in two respects. First, it demonstrates that legislation framed as protecting Jewish Australians was simultaneously being used to restrict Muslim civil society organisations — a dual purpose that civil liberties submissions to CAHE (Law Council PJCIS Sub. 95, HRLC PJCIS Sub. 176, Liberty Victoria PJCIS Sub. 117) warned against. Second, AIJAC describes itself in the same submission as "the premier independent public affairs organisation for the Australian Jewish community" AIJAC, PJCIS Sub. 96 — a claim that the internal Jewish community dissent documented below directly contests.

The internal Jewish community dissent

The Commission should be aware that ECAJ and AIJAC do not speak for the whole of the Australian Jewish community on these questions. Three Jewish organisations submitted contrary positions to CAHE:

The Jewish Council of Australia warned that "overreliance on criminalisation and migration powers cannot meaningfully address racism and antisemitism. Such measures treat racism as an individual pathology to be punished rather than a systemic problem that must be prevented through education." Jewish Council of Australia, PJCIS Sub. 101, CAHE Bill inquiry, 2026

The Australian Jewish Democratic Society (AJDS) cautioned that the legislation "is perceived to be another step in the limitation of free speech and religion … particularly in the Muslim community" and expressed concern at the "rushed timetable for such significant legislation and its omnibus nature." AJDS, PJCIS Sub. 183, CAHE Bill inquiry, 2026

Jewish Voices of Inner Sydney stated directly: "Our fear is created and perpetuated by organs of the state of Israel and pro-Israel legacy Jewish organisations as well as Jewish media both Australian and international." Their submission also noted: "Solidarity with Palestinians and opposition to antisemitism can and do coexist in practice" Jewish Voices of Inner Sydney, PJCIS Sub. 44, CAHE Bill inquiry, 2026 — contesting the central framing of the Segal Plan's campus and online enforcement sections.

These are not fringe positions. They represent formal submissions to a parliamentary inquiry from established Jewish community organisations. The Commission may consider the significance of the fact that these positions have not been prominently represented in the mainstream advocacy evidence placed before it.

4.5 The Shergold Architecture

Professor Peter Shergold AC was appointed to chair the Commonwealth Research Grants Working Group — tasked with creating compliance criteria for ARC grant decisions aligned to the January 2026 hate speech laws. Shergold simultaneously chairs the ARC Board — the primary body awarding competitive research grants across all disciplines. The person who chairs the body that awards research grants is simultaneously chairing the body that determines the political compliance criteria those grants must meet. The Department of Education has dismissed conflict of interest concerns, noting that Shergold has been "transparent" about his dual roles. No public account of how conflicts will be managed has been provided.

4.6 The Pattern and the Divergence

The 34-document comparative analysis documented in Part 3 of this submission shows that Australia's Segal Plan diverges from international norms most significantly in precisely those areas most directly served by the interests documented above:

• Mandatory IHRA adoption — the definitional position most aligned with ECAJ and AIJAC, and least aligned with the international professional consensus documented in the peer corpus
• Funding conditionality — the mechanism that creates the most significant compliance burden for universities and researchers whose work involves contested policy questions
• Visa screening for 'antisemitic views' — a provision with no peer equivalent, enacted in January 2026, whose constitutional validity is pending before the High Court
• Campus enforcement machinery — TEQSA powers, report cards, funding withdrawal — the mechanism that applies the compliance framework to the primary site of political speech about Israel/Palestine in Australia

The convergence between the Plan's outlier positions and the documented interests of the procurement network that shaped its communications environment is not proof of institutional capture. It is a structural pattern that the Commission — which was established, in the broadest sense of its mandate, to examine how minorities are harmed by institutional dynamics — is well-placed to examine before finalising recommendations that extend those provisions further.

Conclusion and Bridge to Submission 7

The empirical analysis in this submission establishes three things:

First: The Segal Plan diverges from international norms in specific, measurable ways. The divergences are not random. They cluster around four provisions — mandatory IHRA adoption, visa screening, funding conditionality, and campus enforcement — that share a common structural characteristic: they extend the state's coercive capacity to classify, penalise, and exclude in ways that have no precedent in comparable peer jurisdictions. Each provision creates a compliance mechanism that, once established, will operate according to whoever administers it at any given time.

Second: The constitutional framework that governs these provisions is actively contested. The NSW Court of Appeal struck down anti-protest laws used in the same political context on 16 April 2026. A constitutional challenge to the enacted CAHE Act is proceeding to a Full Court hearing in September 2026. On 4 June 2026, Gageler CJ issued an interlocutory judgment in White Australia Party Inc v Commonwealth [2026] HCASJ 17, dismissing an application for interim injunctions but accepting — without contest from the Commonwealth — that the proceeding raises a serious question on the implied freedom of political communication. The specific grounds of that challenge — the Australian Communist Party analogy, the implied freedom, and Chapter III — are the same grounds that apply to the broader surveillance and enforcement architecture the Segal Plan recommends.

Third: The institutional environment surrounding the Segal Plan — the CT Group lineage in its communications architecture, the structural conflicts in its procurement and oversight, the absence of competitive tender for its strategic communications contract — provides a structural explanation for why the Plan diverges from international norms in precisely those areas most directly served by the interests of the procurement network that shaped it. This is not proof of institutional capture. It is a pattern that a Royal Commission established to understand how minorities are harmed by institutional dynamics is well-placed to examine.

Submission 7 develops the constitutional and philosophical argument from these foundations. The specific remedy requested in Submission 7 — an independent process-integrity review before final recommendations are made — follows directly from what this submission documents: that the enforcement mechanisms proposed in the Segal Plan were developed in a procurement environment where the interests of the entities shaping the Plan's communications were not publicly disclosed, and where those interests correspond with the Plan's outlier positions rather than with the international professional norms documented in this submission.

The Commission's mandate is to examine how antisemitism harms Australians and how it should be addressed consistently with Australian values and human rights obligations. This submission provides the comparative evidence on which those questions can be answered with reference to documented international practice. Submission 7 argues why the institutional context documented in Part 4 is relevant to the Commission's assessment of the evidence before it.

Recommendations to the Commission

On the basis of the comparative evidence assembled in this submission, the submitter respectfully asks the Commission to consider the following before finalising its recommendations:

• Verify the international comparisons. The Special Envoy should be asked to identify the specific international precedent for each coercive enforcement recommendation — mandatory IHRA adoption, funding conditionality, visa screening, campus report cards, and permanent online monitoring. The comparative evidence in this submission does not support the characterisation that those provisions reflect international norms.
• Treat the Segal Plan as one policy position among several. The Commission should assess the Segal Plan as a submission rather than as documented international best practice. The weight the Commission places on it should reflect the absence of peer precedent for its distinctive provisions and the existence of documented Jewish community dissent from those provisions.
• Obtain independent legal and human-rights review of coercive provisions. Before recommending mandatory IHRA adoption, funding withdrawal from universities, visa screening for views, campus enforcement machinery, or permanent online monitoring, the Commission should obtain independent legal advice on consistency with the implied freedom of political communication and Australia's international human rights obligations, including obligations under ICCPR Articles 18, 19, and 22.
• Consider a process-integrity review. Given the procurement and structural arrangements documented in Part 4, the Commission may consider whether an independent review of the evidentiary collection phase is warranted before finalising its recommendations — particularly where those recommendations extend the enforcement provisions of the Segal Plan.

Evidence graph: Neo4j database — 8045 nodes, 14341 relationships. All peer quotes are verbatim extractions from source PDFs via pdfplumber, stored as Recommendation/Passage nodes traceable to original source PDFs in the evidence archive. Case law passages sourced from official judgments and authoritative reporting as cited.

Classification methodology: Ollama qwen2.5:7b reasoning over peer evidence provided from Neo4j. Classifications are judgments, not factual assertions. All underlying peer evidence is verbatim from the graph.

Generated: 2026-06-08.

Annex A: Recommendation-by-Recommendation Peer Comparison

Each Segal Plan recommendation reviewed in this submission is shown below with its classification stamp, the key reason for that classification, up to five direct peer quotes with full citations and page references, and a Further references list of all other peer documents addressing the same category. This annex provides the primary evidentiary support for the findings summarised in Part 3.

DEFINITION[CONTESTED]

The Australian government should require consistent application and adoption of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism across all levels of government, public institutions and regulatory bodies.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.4

ⓘ The peer evidence shows significant variation in approaches to defining and addressing antisemitism, indicating a contested nature of this policy recommendation.25 countries

One form of racial, religious and social intolerance is antisemitism. According to the working and legally non-binding definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), antisemitism is 'a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.' The Republic of Croatia applies this definition in teacher education, and in May 2019 the Croatian translation of the guidelines for its application in the education system was published. The importance of the definition was also recognized at the parliamentary level. In 2020, the Education, Science and Culture Committee of the Croatian Parliament adopted a Conclusion encouraging Croatian public institutions and civil society to promote the definition of antisemitism.

Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21

In order to guarantee the effective adoption and implementation of the WDA in Italian society at regulatory, institutional, political, cultural and educational level, a possible classification is presented which systematically aggregates the IHRA guiding examples cited above (in line with the examples of the “broad spectrum” of manifestations of antisemitism provided in the Handbook for the practical use of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism).

Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.14

The Federal Government’s aim is therefore to apply the 5×3 model and pay appropriate attention to the IHRA’s working definition when funding projects to foster Jewish life and fight antisemitism.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.16

4. Adoption of IHRA’s working definition of “antisemitism in sport” by sports federations. Ministry of Youth and Sports, Commission for Protection against Discrimination.

Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.11

The UK Government should reconvene the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism, with all relevant government departments attending: Home Office, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Foreign Office, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Department for Education, the Department for Justice, the Cabinet Office, and others on an ad-hoc basis. The key Jewish representative bodies that previously sat on this group, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Jewish Leadership Council and the Community Security Trust are key partners and should be the permanent representatives of the community throughout this Parliament.

United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4

Further references addressing this category: - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.39 - United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.23 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.125 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.33 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.12 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.35 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.43 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.5 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The implied freedom of political communication established in Lange v ABC [1997] HCA 25 requires that any burden on political communication be proportionate and justified. Mandatory IHRA adoption — which the IHRA's own working definition includes examples that characterise criticism of Israeli state conduct as potentially antisemitic — creates a definitional framework that may burden political communication about Israel/Palestine. The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down NSW laws used to restrict precisely such protests.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

DEFINITION[CONTESTED]

The Envoy will work with state and federal governments to require the IHRA working definition of antisemitism to be used across all levels of government and public institutions to inform their practical understanding of antisemitism.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.4

ⓘ The peer evidence shows significant variation in approaches to defining and addressing antisemitism, indicating a contested nature of this policy recommendation.25 countries

The Federal Government’s aim is therefore to apply the 5×3 model and pay appropriate attention to the IHRA’s working definition when funding projects to foster Jewish life and fight antisemitism.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.16

To provide a better understanding of antisemitism, the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism includes eleven examples of how antisemitism can manifest itself. Such manifestations can emerge in various contexts, including in public life, the media, schools, the workplace and the religious sphere.

Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.13

One form of racial, religious and social intolerance is antisemitism. According to the working and legally non-binding definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), antisemitism is 'a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.' The Republic of Croatia applies this definition in teacher education, and in May 2019 the Croatian translation of the guidelines for its application in the education system was published. The importance of the definition was also recognized at the parliamentary level. In 2020, the Education, Science and Culture Committee of the Croatian Parliament adopted a Conclusion encouraging Croatian public institutions and civil society to promote the definition of antisemitism.

Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21

Governments and international organizations are encouraged to: • Implement strategies and action plans on antisemitism that engage institutions at all levels in close consultation with Jewish communities, civil society, field researchers, and other relevant stakeholders. • Appoint national coordinators, special envoys, or designated officials to address antisemitism and to enhance collaboration with other state and non-state stakeholders

United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.17

The Government of Hungary supports and encourages local governments, institutions, social and sports organizations to adopt and apply the IHRA definition.

Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.12

Further references addressing this category: - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.39 - United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.23 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.125 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.12 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.35 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.4 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.43 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.5 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The implied freedom of political communication established in Lange v ABC [1997] HCA 25 requires that any burden on political communication be proportionate and justified. Mandatory IHRA adoption — which the IHRA's own working definition includes examples that characterise criticism of Israeli state conduct as potentially antisemitic — creates a definitional framework that may burden political communication about Israel/Palestine. The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down NSW laws used to restrict precisely such protests.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

DEFINITION[CONTESTED]

The Envoy will publish a supplementary guide to the IHRA definition (an IHRA Handbook), which will assist in its application in an Australian context.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.4

Implementation note. This recommendation has been fulfilled. The Australian Special Envoy for Antisemitism published Understanding Antisemitism in Australia in April 2026, and separately Defining Antisemitism: An Explainer — both functioning as the anticipated IHRA Handbook. (RC Hearing Transcript Day 4, 7 May 2026, p.96)

Publication of implementation guidance for the IHRA definition is broadly aligned with international practice. The European Commission published its own Handbook for the Practical Use of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism in January 2021, explicitly designed for police, prosecutors, and civil society organisations across member states. Italy's 2025 national strategy similarly includes a practical guide for identifying, classifying, and gathering data on antisemitism (Italy, Strategia Nazionale, 2025, p.3). The substantive question for the Commission is not whether such guidance should be published — that is settled — but whether the illustrative examples in the guidance are applied consistently with the free speech and academic freedom safeguards discussed in the contextual note to Recommendation 1 above.

ⓘ The peer evidence does not consistently support the recommendation, with only a few countries addressing similar definitions or guidelines, indicating a split in international approaches.25 countries

The IHRA Working Definition notes that “overall context” must be “taken into account” and that antisemitism is “not limited” to the examples given. It furthermore states that the “examples may serve as illustrations” to “guide IHRA in its work,” and points to the practical utility of the definition.

Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.13

Sweden also endorses the IHRA's (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism and the list of examples that can serve as a guide, depending on the context.

Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.3

One form of racial, religious and social intolerance is antisemitism. According to the working and legally non-binding definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), antisemitism is 'a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.' The Republic of Croatia applies this definition in teacher education, and in May 2019 the Croatian translation of the guidelines for its application in the education system was published. The importance of the definition was also recognized at the parliamentary level. In 2020, the Education, Science and Culture Committee of the Croatian Parliament adopted a Conclusion encouraging Croatian public institutions and civil society to promote the definition of antisemitism.

Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21

The EU will use all available tools to call on partner countries to actively combat antisemitism, taking into account the IHRA definition of antisemitism.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.49

The Federal Government’s aim is therefore to apply the 5×3 model and pay appropriate attention to the IHRA’s working definition when funding projects to foster Jewish life and fight antisemitism.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.16

Further references addressing this category: - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.39 - United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.23 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.125 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.33 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.12 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.35 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.4 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.5 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The implied freedom of political communication established in Lange v ABC [1997] HCA 25 requires that any burden on political communication be proportionate and justified. Mandatory IHRA adoption — which the IHRA's own working definition includes examples that characterise criticism of Israeli state conduct as potentially antisemitic — creates a definitional framework that may burden political communication about Israel/Palestine. The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down NSW laws used to restrict precisely such protests.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

SURVEILLANCE[CONTESTED]

The Special Envoy recommends the establishment of permanent bodies to monitor incidents, including online monitoring.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.6

ⓘ The peer evidence does not consistently support the establishment of permanent bodies for online monitoring, indicating a split among international approaches.24 countries

An annual grant of DKK 300,000 is provided to the Jewish Community’s Department for Mapping and Knowledge Sharing of Anti-Semitic Incidents (AKVAH) to strengthen existing monitoring of anti-Semitic incidents, including those on the Internet, as well as to support and guide people who have been exposed to an anti-Semitic incident.

Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.10

Further references addressing this category: - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.75 - United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.23 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.15 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.54 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.33 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.157 - Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.28 - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.17 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.43 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.73 - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.32 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.7 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.43 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.21 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.24 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.6

Court case: Constitutional Context

The HC challenge in White Australia Party Inc v Commonwealth [2026] HCASJ 17 is proceeding to a Full Court hearing in September 2026. On 4 June 2026, Gageler CJ dismissed the plaintiffs' interlocutory application for injunctive relief; the Commonwealth did not contest the existence of a serious question to be determined on the implied freedom of political communication. The plaintiffs rely on Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5 — where a 6:1 majority struck down the Communist Party Dissolution Act on the ground that Parliament cannot dissolve a political organisation by legislative declaration. The Full Court hearing will determine whether the Segal Plan's enacted legislative architecture survives constitutional review.

Judicial review of proscription — Parliament cannot self-validate. The characterisation of a body as dangerous to the security of the Commonwealth cannot be made by Parliament itself so as to place it beyond judicial review. The characterisation of facts upon which the Parliament purports to act is a matter for judicial determination.

Composite summary of majority reasoning, (1951) 83 CLR 1

Dixon J — Constitution and rule of law. The Constitution is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, as, for example, in separating the judicial power from other functions of government, to some of which it does not. Among those to which it gives effect is the rule of law.

Dixon J, Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193

LEGISLATION[CONTESTED]

The Envoy will develop guidance for, and ensure comprehensive education is provided to, police, prosecutors, the judiciary and regulatory authorities so that the application of the law is informed by a thorough understanding of antisemitism.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.6

ⓘ The peer evidence shows varying approaches and no clear international consensus, indicating reasonable positions exist on both sides.25 countries

Develop within the police an individual needs assessment form for victims of antisemitism hate crimes («Individual Needs Assessment») to be completed immediately to ensure that services are provided to the victim according to their specific needs, particularly immediate safety and protection needs.

Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.23

Provide education and training to police specialists and prosecutors on prosecuting antisemitic hate crimes using existing tools (e.g., existing internal training for law enforcement agencies, CEPOL, EJTN, etc.), sharing best practices, and using e-learning opportunities.

Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19

The National Bureau of Investigation of the Rapid Response and Special Police Services (RRSPS NBI) have contacted the specialised units of Europol in almost each case right after ordering the investigation of terrorist acts and criminal offences motivated by antisemitism. In doing so, they not only used the ESN (European Security Network) secure information exchange networking application, SIENA, which is a system provided by Europol, but also participated in online conference meetings with Europol.

Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.35

Although anti-Semitism is sparse in Latvia, understanding the problem at global and European Union level, as well as solidarity guidelines) that law enforcement authorities, in addition to the existing legal framework, use the International Holocaust Memorial Alliance's definition (IHRA) of antisemitism as another tool for identifying hate crimes.

Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.26

The National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) will expand its investment in K-12 education on Jewish history through partnering with independent organizations and other federal agencies, such as the USHMM and the Smithsonian, to develop educational materials about Jewish history. Materials will include trainings and other resources for educators nationwide including content on antisemitism and Jewish history.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.16

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.39 - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.125 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.29 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.35 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.4 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32 - Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.28 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.43 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.5 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The HC challenge in White Australia Party Inc v Commonwealth [2026] HCASJ 17 is proceeding to a Full Court hearing in September 2026. On 4 June 2026, Gageler CJ dismissed the plaintiffs' interlocutory application for injunctive relief; the Commonwealth did not contest the existence of a serious question to be determined on the implied freedom of political communication. The plaintiffs rely on Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5 — where a 6:1 majority struck down the Communist Party Dissolution Act on the ground that Parliament cannot dissolve a political organisation by legislative declaration. The Full Court hearing will determine whether the Segal Plan's enacted legislative architecture survives constitutional review.

Judicial review of proscription — Parliament cannot self-validate. The characterisation of a body as dangerous to the security of the Commonwealth cannot be made by Parliament itself so as to place it beyond judicial review. The characterisation of facts upon which the Parliament purports to act is a matter for judicial determination.

Composite summary of majority reasoning, (1951) 83 CLR 1

Dixon J — Constitution and rule of law. The Constitution is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, as, for example, in separating the judicial power from other functions of government, to some of which it does not. Among those to which it gives effect is the rule of law.

Dixon J, Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193

DEFINITION[CONTESTED]

The Australian Government, several state governments, and dozens of international governments have endorsed the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism, including its illustrative examples, as best practice for identifying antisemitism.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.7

ⓘ The peer evidence shows significant variation in approaches to defining antisemitism, with only some countries referencing the IHRA definition, indicating a contested nature.25 countries

Sweden also endorses the IHRA's (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism and the list of examples that can serve as a guide, depending on the context.

Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.3

One form of racial, religious and social intolerance is antisemitism. According to the working and legally non-binding definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), antisemitism is 'a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.' The Republic of Croatia applies this definition in teacher education, and in May 2019 the Croatian translation of the guidelines for its application in the education system was published. The importance of the definition was also recognized at the parliamentary level. In 2020, the Education, Science and Culture Committee of the Croatian Parliament adopted a Conclusion encouraging Croatian public institutions and civil society to promote the definition of antisemitism.

Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21

The Government Decision 1039/2019 (18 February) calls upon the Minister of Justice to include the Freedom of Expression Thematic Working Group in examining the option to apply the antisemitism definition developed in the framework of the International Holocaust Remembrance Association, and to submit a report to the Government. Similarly, as stated in Section 3, the Decision also calls upon the Minister of Justice to examine the option to integrate the antisemitism definition developed in the framework of the International Holocaust Remembrance Association into IM Decree 5/1991 (4 April) [of the Minister of Justice], and to submit a report about the same to the Government.

Original: Adott a Kormányzat 1039/2019 (18 február) számú döntés, amelyben a Szabadkifejezés Témakörét az Újságjogi Munkacsoport keretében értékelni kell meg az antiszemitizmus definíció alkalmazásának lehetőségét, és általában jelentkező raportot kell készíteni a Kormány számára. Ugyanúgy, mint a 3. cikkben, a döntés felhívja az Újságjogi Minisztert arra a figyelmet, hogy az IM 5/1991 (4 április) [Újságjogi Miniszter] rendeletébe beillesztse az antiszemitizmus definíció alkalmazásának lehetőségét, és jelentkező raportot készítsen a Kormány számára.

Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.10

Resolution No.633 of the Council of Ministers of 20 October 2017 adopting the working definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and designating a national coordinator on combating antisemitism.

Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.4

Although anti-Semitism is sparse in Latvia, understanding the problem at global and European Union level, as well as solidarity guidelines) that law enforcement authorities, in addition to the existing legal framework, use the International Holocaust Memorial Alliance's definition (IHRA) of antisemitism as another tool for identifying hate crimes.

Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.26

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.39 - United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.23 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.125 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.35 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.43 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.44 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.5 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The implied freedom of political communication established in Lange v ABC [1997] HCA 25 requires that any burden on political communication be proportionate and justified. Mandatory IHRA adoption — which the IHRA's own working definition includes examples that characterise criticism of Israeli state conduct as potentially antisemitic — creates a definitional framework that may burden political communication about Israel/Palestine. The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down NSW laws used to restrict precisely such protests.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

Contextual Discussion: The IHRA Definition — Government Endorsement vs Institutional Adoption

The Segal Plan's claim that "dozens of international governments" have endorsed the IHRA working definition is factually accurate. As of 2025, the IHRA definition has been formally adopted or endorsed by more than 40 national governments, the European Parliament (2017), and the EU Council (2018, 2020). Twelve countries in this comparative corpus explicitly reference it in their national strategies.

However, the characterisation of IHRA as "best practice for identifying antisemitism" — particularly in university and research contexts — is significantly contested, including within the proceedings of this Royal Commission.

The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA)

The JDA was released in March 2021 and explicitly positions itself as "an alternative" to the IHRA definition. It was signed by over 370 scholars internationally. The JDA's core definition is:

"Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish)."

— Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, March 2021 (jerusalemdeclaration.org)

The JDA's 15 guidelines are grouped in three sections. The critical structural difference from IHRA lies in Section C — "Israel and Palestine: Examples that are not antisemitic" (guidelines 11–15), which IHRA omits entirely:

• Guideline 11: "Supporting the Palestinian demand for justice and the full grant of their political, national, civil and human rights, as encapsulated in international law."
• Guideline 12: "Criticizing or opposing Zionism as a form of nationalism, or arguing for a variety of constitutional arrangements for Jews and Palestinians in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean."
• Guideline 13: "Evidence-based criticism of Israel as a state. This includes its institutions and founding principles... even if contentious, it is not antisemitic to compare Israel with other historical cases."
• Guideline 14: "Boycott, divestment and sanctions are commonplace, non-violent forms of political protest against states. In the Israeli case they are not, in and of themselves, antisemitic."
• Guideline 15: "Political speech does not have to be measured, proportional, tempered, or reasonable to be protected... Criticism that some may see as excessive or contentious is not, in and of itself, antisemitic."

These guidelines directly address what universities, civil liberties organisations, and academic freedom advocates identify as the core problem with the IHRA definition in educational settings: the absence of any explicit protection for scholarship and political speech about Israel-Palestine.

Evidence before this Royal Commission

The Commission itself examined the IHRA/JDA debate during Day 8 of hearings (14 May 2026). Counsel put to a witness that the Commission had received a letter signed by 104 civil society organisations — including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Physicians for Human Rights — addressed to the UN Secretary-General raising concerns about the IHRA definition. The Commission also received legal opinions from Tomlinson KC and Jeffrey Robinson KC, and scholarly analysis from Dr Brian Klug and Professor Amos Goldberg, each questioning aspects of the IHRA definition's application. (RC Hearing Transcript Day 8, 14 May 2026, p.37)

A witness in Day 8 acknowledged awareness of the criticism that the IHRA definition is "vague, unclear and potentially confusing" (ibid., p.38), while defending it as a practical tool for investigators. The same witness characterised the distinction directly:

"The IHRA definition was written by practitioners to be a practical tool. The Jerusalem Declaration was written by academics to set out their views, and they read differently in that way."

— Witness, RC Hearing Transcript Day 8, 14 May 2026, p.50

This framing — IHRA as a practitioner tool, JDA as an academic instrument — supports rather than undermines the case for context-differentiated definitional guidance. Universities and research institutions operate primarily in the academic register; mandating a practitioner instrument across that context, as the Segal Plan proposes, conflates two distinct institutional purposes.

Peer evidence on contestation

Norway's 2024 national action plan explicitly acknowledges: "There are ongoing attempts to establish a uniform definition of antisemitism, with discussions in both academic and political circles about what should be included" (Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025–2030, p.13). Austria's 2025 strategy states the IHRA working definition "should not be used to restrict expressions of opinion through political instrumentalization" and that "criticism of Israel that is comparable to criticism of other states cannot be considered antisemitic" (Austria, Nationale Strategie 2.0, p.47). Austria also notes: "The working definition of antisemitism is a non-binding text" (ibid.). The Czech Republic adopted IHRA only in 2024, after endorsement by both chambers of its parliament — illustrating that even committed IHRA adopters treat formal endorsement as a deliberative process.

The law enforcement context — a documented hazard

The RC Day 8 witness characterised the IHRA definition as "a practical tool for investigators." That characterisation is precisely the problem. Embedding a contested, non-legally-binding working document into police and prosecutorial practice has produced serious documented harms — harms directly relevant to Australia's constitutional and human rights framework.

In the United Kingdom, Palestine Action was proscribed as a terrorist organisation in July 2025 under the Terrorism Act 2000. The proscription made it a criminal offence to wear or display anything that might "arouse reasonable suspicion" of support for the organisation — a standard explicitly targeting placards, signs, and protest insignia. Metropolitan Police arrested 857 people in a single weekend (August 2025) for "showing support" at protests. A 74-year-old retired executive was arrested three separate times for holding a cardboard sign reading "I oppose genocide. I support Palestine Action," each occasion generating terrorism charges. Britain's High Court overturned the proscription in February 2026 as incompatible with free speech — the government appealed. (NBC News; Washington Post, 8 September 2025; Al Jazeera, 11 April 2026)

The UK trajectory illustrates a documented pathway: a broad, illustrative-example-laden definition of antisemitism, applied in law enforcement contexts, creates a mechanism by which legitimate political protest is classified as terrorism-adjacent hate speech. The IHRA definition's illustrative example that "denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination" can be antisemitic — when applied by police facing a placard reading "Free Palestine" — collapses the distinction between political speech and criminal incitement.

The scholars' briefing already in this Commission's evidence archive is unambiguous: "The IHRA-WDA has been criticized for its vagueness and contradictions: it fails as a definition according to its own criteria. Even the authors of the IHRA-WDA have protested the misuse of their working document."

— International Scholars, Briefing: The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism — Combating Racism, Enabling Protest (2021), p.4

Austria's 2025 national strategy is even more direct on the criminal-statistics question: "A statistical analysis based on the extra-legal IHRA working definition (or any other definition of antisemitism) is not possible and, from a purely criminal statistics perspective, is not required de lege lata."

— Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.69

Austria explicitly distinguishes the IHRA definition's legitimate educational and awareness-raising role from its inapplicability in criminal law contexts — a position supported by the definition's own non-binding designation and by the fact that its illustrative examples were drafted for research and data collection, not for prosecutorial standards.

Submission 7 recommendation

Rather than mandating the IHRA definition as "best practice" across all institutional contexts — and emphatically not for law enforcement and prosecutorial use — the Royal Commission should recommend a strict institutional separation:

• Law enforcement, policing, and prosecution: Use only the existing definitions in criminal law — hate crime provisions, anti-discrimination statutes, and incitement offences as legislated. No working definition of antisemitism, whether IHRA or JDA, should be adopted as a standard by which police assess whether a protest, placard, or statement crosses into criminal conduct. The bright-line test for police is the criminal law, not an advisory working document.
• Educational, government, and civil society contexts: The federal government, in consultation with Universities Australia, civil liberties organisations, and affected communities, should develop context-appropriate definitional guidance. This process should consider both the IHRA definition and the JDA side by side — including the JDA's explicit Section C guidelines on what does not constitute antisemitism — as a safeguard against the overreach documented in this submission.
• Research and data collection: Statistics on antisemitic incidents should be collected using the operational definitions embedded in criminal law, not the extra-legal IHRA working definition, consistent with Austria's formal legal position. Any supplementary use of IHRA for research categorisation should be clearly distinguished from criminal classifications and should not generate law enforcement referrals.

The Commission should note that the JDA's Section C guidelines (items 11–15 of the JDA) function precisely as an exclusion list — specifying political speech, criticism of Israel, support for Palestinian rights, and BDS advocacy as conduct that does not constitute antisemitism. Adopting these exclusions as an explicit safeguard in any definitional guidance framework would directly address the pathway by which the UK arrived at arresting protesters for holding placards.

DEFINITION[CONTESTED]

Recognizing its value and status, the Australian government should require consistent application and adoption of the IHRA definition across all levels of government, public institutions, and regulatory bodies. This will provide a unified framework for identifying, educating on, monitoring, and responding effectively to antisemitic incidents.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.7

ⓘ The peer evidence shows significant variation in approaches to adopting the IHRA definition, indicating a contested issue.25 countries

To guarantee that the fight against antisemitism takes place across all administrative levels (national, regional and local), it is recommended that Local Administrations adopt/concretely use the IHRA definition of antisemitism with the examples and indicators presented in the Report as criteria for identifying expressions of it.

Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.23

One form of racial, religious and social intolerance is antisemitism. According to the working and legally non-binding definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), antisemitism is 'a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.' The Republic of Croatia applies this definition in teacher education, and in May 2019 the Croatian translation of the guidelines for its application in the education system was published. The importance of the definition was also recognized at the parliamentary level. In 2020, the Education, Science and Culture Committee of the Croatian Parliament adopted a Conclusion encouraging Croatian public institutions and civil society to promote the definition of antisemitism.

Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21

The Government of Hungary supports and encourages local governments, institutions, social and sports organizations to adopt and apply the IHRA definition.

Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.12

Although anti-Semitism is sparse in Latvia, understanding the problem at global and European Union level, as well as solidarity guidelines) that law enforcement authorities, in addition to the existing legal framework, use the International Holocaust Memorial Alliance's definition (IHRA) of antisemitism as another tool for identifying hate crimes.

Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.26

We call on a diverse range of student groups in K-12 schools and colleges to play a role in preventing and addressing antisemitism. This may include condemning antisemitic incidents on their campuses, hosting events alongside Jewish organizations on a wide range of topics, and educating their membership about cross-cultural solidarity.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.42

Further references addressing this category: - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.39 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.125 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.35 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.4 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.43 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.44 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.5 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The implied freedom of political communication established in Lange v ABC [1997] HCA 25 requires that any burden on political communication be proportionate and justified. Mandatory IHRA adoption — which the IHRA's own working definition includes examples that characterise criticism of Israeli state conduct as potentially antisemitic — creates a definitional framework that may burden political communication about Israel/Palestine. The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down NSW laws used to restrict precisely such protests.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

MEDIA[CONTESTED]

The Envoy will establish a project to support trusted voices to publicly refute antisemitic views, particularly via social media platforms.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.8

Analytical note. Counter-messaging campaigns that directly refute extremist content online are rarely effective as a mechanism for reducing hostility, and may be counterproductive. Research in counter-extremism consistently finds that open contestation amplifies the original message by increasing its reach; platform algorithms surface disputed content more prominently; and target audiences interpret public refutation as evidence of persecution, reinforcing in-group identity. The peer evidence (below) reflects this: international strategies emphasise education, dialogue, and community resilience — not adversarial refutation via social media platforms. The mechanism by which "trusted voices" would be selected, funded, and held accountable is not specified in the Segal Plan.

ⓘ The peer evidence shows varying approaches to addressing antisemitism, with some focusing on education and dialogue rather than directly refuting views via social media.25 countries

We call on influencers of all kinds—especially those in popular culture such as athletes, gamers, and entertainers—to use their platforms to increase understanding and awareness of antisemitism. They should use important dates in the calendar to reach their followers, demonstrate allyship through public statements or social media messages, and use their platforms to lift up stories of people who have been victimized by antisemitism or are fighting against it. Experts on antisemitism and communications

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.21

Conduct awareness and sensitization campaigns for victims of antisemitism hate crimes in various areas, continuing with messages on the Ministry of Interior’s website and social media accounts, through which to sensitize society to this issue. These campaigns will be intensified during commemorative dates and significant days or in response to particularly grave acts with social repercussions.

Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.23

In Thuringia, a prevention project (‘Perspektivwechsel – Praxisstelle Thüringen’) is aimed at furthering the professional skills of practitioners and supervisors in education, social work, youth work, public administration, law enforcement, and the justice system with regard to the prevention of antisemitism and discrimination and in order to foster an appreciation for diversity.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.31

The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science is going to support the NCAB by focusing on this campaign through a variety of channels (including the primary/secondary education newsletter (po/vo-nieuwsbrief), the Citizenship Expertise Unit and social media). Attention is also being drawn across society to existing and special products and activities which relate to Holocaust remembrance and education, including through social media, street posters and radio commercials. The campaign is to be funded from the NCAB’s budget in 2025.

Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32

The 'Zusammen1' project is a pioneer that targets football clubs. It provides workshops for trainers, trainees, youth members, and club officials to educate them about Jewish life, sensitize them to antisemitic narratives, and create positive connections with Jewish history.

Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.216

Further references addressing this category: - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.30 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.17 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.10 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.35 - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.24 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.43 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.7 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.17 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.18 - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.47 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.49 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.7 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.31 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.8 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.31 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.13 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.2

Court case: Constitutional Context

The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down laws used to suppress protests about Israeli state conduct. A surveillance infrastructure that monitors online political speech about Israel/Palestine — and investigates 'overseas funding' for ideological positions — must satisfy the Lange proportionality test. The political context of the NSWCA case — protest suppression in the context of the same political conflict the Segal Plan addresses — is directly relevant to whether such surveillance would be applied in a viewpoint-neutral manner.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

MEDIA[CONTESTED]

The Envoy will monitor media organisations to encourage accurate, fair and responsible reporting and assist them to meet their editorial standards and commitment to impartiality and balance and to avoid accepting false or distorted narratives.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.8

Analytical note — implementation and enforcement. Monitoring media organisations for compliance with editorial standards is a function performed in liberal democracies by independent statutory bodies (ACMA in Australia, Ofcom in the UK, the Press Council) with defined legislative remit, transparent complaint procedures, and published adjudications. The Segal Plan proposes that a political appointee — the Envoy — would conduct this monitoring function, without specifying the legal basis, criteria for determining what constitutes a "false or distorted narrative," or the consequences for organisations found non-compliant.

In states where government officials directly monitor and correct media output on politically sensitive topics, that function is characterised in comparative constitutional law as a form of prior restraint or administrative censorship. The peer evidence (below) shows no comparable model in liberal democracies. The enforcement question — what consequences attach to a media organisation that declines to accept the Envoy's characterisation of a narrative as false — is answered implicitly by the dual-track enforcement architecture described in Section 3.3 of this submission: funding conditionality applied by the Envoy with no independent review mechanism.

ⓘ The peer evidence does not address media monitoring and instead focuses on education, dialogue, and legal protections related to human rights and racism.25 countries

We call on creators such as writers, producers, and directors to avoid stereotypical depictions of Jewish people and content that promotes misinformation about Judaism as a religion and Jewish culture, and to consider consulting organizations that have helped train media corporations, content creators, journalists, and reporters to identify antisemitic terms and tropes.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.21

A reinforced involvement of civil society organisations and Jewish communities is key for the strategy to be successful. The Commission and the Member States monitor the respect of these rules for all EU-funded programmes.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.8

Universities should actively reach out to Jewish other minority groups to ensure that they are fully cognisant of reporting processes and feel empowered to use them. The Union of Jewish Students and their Jewish Societies are the representative voice for Jewish students in universities. All UK universities should work with the Union of Jewish Students to make campuses more inclusive, for example; more antisemitism awareness training in student unions and for university staff, especially at senior levels; encouraging more kosher accommodation; and flexibility around timetabling.

United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.10

• identify relay persons in informal living areas and gypsy camps to assist victims in filing complaints (school mediators, social workers) and train and equip them

France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.43

During talks with the Netherlands Association of Universities of Applied Sciences (Vereniging Hogescholen, VH) and Universities of The Netherlands (Universiteiten van Nederland, UNL) about this monitor, the Minister of Education, Culture and Science will also discuss with them the possibilities of including the perceived safety of Jewish students and employees.

Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.17

Further references addressing this category: - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.30 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.17 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.157 - Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.28 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.35 - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.24 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.7 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.17 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.18 - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.47 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.7 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.31 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.8 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.31 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.13 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.2

Court case: Constitutional Context

The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down laws used to suppress protests about Israeli state conduct. A surveillance infrastructure that monitors online political speech about Israel/Palestine — and investigates 'overseas funding' for ideological positions — must satisfy the Lange proportionality test. The political context of the NSWCA case — protest suppression in the context of the same political conflict the Segal Plan addresses — is directly relevant to whether such surveillance would be applied in a viewpoint-neutral manner.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

CAMPUS[CONTESTED]

The Envoy will develop and launch a university report card, assessing each university’s implementation of effective practices and standards to combat antisemitism, including complaints systems and best practice policies, as well as consideration of whether the campus/online environment is conducive to Jewish students and staff participating actively and equally in university life.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.8

ⓘ The peer evidence does not provide clear support for a universal approach to assessing universities' implementation of practices to combat antisemitism, indicating reasonable positions exist on both sides.23 countries

Universities should actively reach out to Jewish other minority groups to ensure that they are fully cognisant of reporting processes and feel empowered to use them. The Union of Jewish Students and their Jewish Societies are the representative voice for Jewish students in universities. All UK universities should work with the Union of Jewish Students to make campuses more inclusive, for example; more antisemitism awareness training in student unions and for university staff, especially at senior levels; encouraging more kosher accommodation; and flexibility around timetabling.

United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.10

We call on American sports teams to collaborate with nonprofit organizations and one another to create and share best practices for educating fans about Judaism, Jewish heritage, culture, and identity, and the Holocaust, and empowering them to combat antisemitism and all forms of hate.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.20

The Commission will: Take action to combat antisemitism and foster Jewish life at regional and local level, including by mapping and developing a guide of good practices and training for organisations that operate at regional and local levels.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.19

a. Establish a United Nations Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group to monitor, evaluate and assess the impact of policies and measures to address antisemitism on a regular basis. Each United Nations entity in the Working Group will report on measures it has taken to implement this Action Plan. The Working Group will convene in quarterly meetings, or as appropriate, and conduct its work in consultation with relevant stakeholders, such as Jewish organizations and communities, to exchange information and observations about activities being undertaken to respond to antisemitism.

United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.12

The Federal Government Commissioner for Jewish Life in Germany and the Fight against Antisemitism will actively communicate the National Strategy to the general public.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.46

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.125 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.10 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.24 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.33 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.7 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.5 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.26 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.13 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The Lange test requires proportionality. Conditioning research funding on retrospective political compliance assessment burdens freedom of political communication without clear justification proportionate to that burden. Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43 established that the implied freedom protects 'the free expression of political opinion, including through peaceful protest.' Research and scholarship on contested political topics — Israel/Palestine, refugee policy, Indigenous rights — is political communication in the constitutional sense. Conditioning it on ideological compliance does not survive structured proportionality review.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

CAMPUS[CONTESTED]

The Envoy will work with government to enable government funding to be withheld, where possible, from universities, programs or individuals within universities that facilitate, enable or fail to act against antisemitism. Working with government and grant authorities, the Envoy will, where possible, establish that all public grants provided to university centres, academics or researchers can be subject to termination where the recipient engages in antisemitic or otherwise discriminatory or hateful speech or actions.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.8

ⓘ The peer evidence is split, with only the United States showing a similar provision for funding related to hate crimes, while other countries focus on different aspects of combating discrimination.23 countries

The Italian government adopted the WDA and entrusted the National Coordinator for the fight against antisemitism with the duty of surveying expressions and behaviours of antisemitism to identify possible actions for its implementation.

Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.3

Actions • a stronger criminal framework to combat antisemitic hate crimes and hate speech by increasing the severity of penalties; • implementation of the Digital Services Act in Luxembourg to combat illegal content online; • increased promotion of existing and future opportunities for reporting antisemitic hate speech online through BEE SECURE awareness campaigns aimed at the general public.

Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.13

Award national fellowships for thematic works dedicated to the fight against discrimination, intolerance, hate speech and antisemitism, including taking into account the Holocaust Research Fund Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski” and universities active in the field Bulgarian Academy of Science

Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.21

Whether the incident is a swastika in a school, antisemitic leafletting of a neighborhood, or online harassment of a community member, community and civil society leaders must identify these incidents as antisemitic and strongly condemn them. Such local leadership is critical to uniting a community against antisemitism and marginalizing those who engage in antisemitic speech and conduct.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.36

As part of the implementation of the Online Safety Act 2023, the UK Government must work with online platforms to eradicate antisemitism online and hold those accountable who knowingly fail to block their systems from promoting it.

United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.17

Further references addressing this category: - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.125 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.10 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.24 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.33 - Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.28 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.21 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.5 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.26 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.13 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The Lange test requires proportionality. Conditioning research funding on retrospective political compliance assessment burdens freedom of political communication without clear justification proportionate to that burden. Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43 established that the implied freedom protects 'the free expression of political opinion, including through peaceful protest.' Research and scholarship on contested political topics — Israel/Palestine, refugee policy, Indigenous rights — is political communication in the constitutional sense. Conditioning it on ideological compliance does not survive structured proportionality review.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

CAMPUS[CONTESTED]

A commission of inquiry into campus antisemitism, including the sources of funding for organised clusters of antisemitism, should be commissioned by the Federal Government if systemic problems remain in universities by the start of the 2026 academic year.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.8

ⓘ The peer evidence is split, with only the United States showing a similar provision addressing hate crimes, while other countries focus on broader human rights and cooperation.23 countries

ED will raise awareness about ED resources that can be utilized to prevent and address antisemitism, such as funding from the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act and resources available through ED’s technical assistance centers. ED will also, where appropriate, disseminate information about other federal agencies’ resources and events that may be applicable to school and campus communities.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.40

The Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration funds projects to fight antisemitism by fostering Jewish-Muslim dialogue: this project (“Schalom Aleikum Jüdisch-Muslimischer Dialog”) of the Central Council of Jews in Germany has received funding under the auspices of the national program to prevent Islamist extremism (NPP) since 2019. In 2022, the dialogue project was expanded into the “Denkfabrik Schalom Aleikum,” a think tank that will also include Christian participants.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.28

The Commission will therefore take the fight against antisemitism systematically into consideration when developing policies, legislation and funding programmes, and aims to enhance active cooperation with Member States on mainstreaming tools and practices in the fight against discrimination and antisemitism.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.8

The federal government, Länder (states), municipalities, science, and civil society are recommended to coordinate commemorative projects that address not only a historical review but also current and future issues – such as antisemitism, racism, democratic education, and human rights.

Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.148

The Programme organizes year-long Holocaust education and remembrance outreach to amplify its themes of countering antisemitism and prejudice, and of defending human rights.

United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.19

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.10 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.24 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.33 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.7 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.5 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.26 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.13 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The Lange test requires proportionality. Conditioning research funding on retrospective political compliance assessment burdens freedom of political communication without clear justification proportionate to that burden. Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43 established that the implied freedom protects 'the free expression of political opinion, including through peaceful protest.' Research and scholarship on contested political topics — Israel/Palestine, refugee policy, Indigenous rights — is political communication in the constitutional sense. Conditioning it on ideological compliance does not survive structured proportionality review.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

CAMPUS[CONTESTED]

Working with the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency the Envoy will advocate to ensure that systemic action is taken to reverse a dangerous trajectory of normalised antisemitism in many university courses and campuses.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.8

ⓘ The peer evidence is split, with only a few countries addressing antisemitism in higher education directly, creating reasonable positions on both sides.23 countries

a. Establish a United Nations Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group to monitor, evaluate and assess the impact of policies and measures to address antisemitism on a regular basis. Each United Nations entity in the Working Group will report on measures it has taken to implement this Action Plan. The Working Group will convene in quarterly meetings, or as appropriate, and conduct its work in consultation with relevant stakeholders, such as Jewish organizations and communities, to exchange information and observations about activities being undertaken to respond to antisemitism.

United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.12

Teachers must be equipped to avoid exclusion in the school The work of preventing hate crimes begins in school. The Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism and the Absalon University College have previously developed an inspiration catalog for school leaders and teachers; 'Democratic communities - Prevention of polarization and exclusion in school'. This has been done in close collaboration with the National Agency for Education and Quality. The inspiration catalog must now be disseminated by improving the skills of teachers and lecturers in the specific methods that appear in the catalog.

Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14

The White House Office of Public Engagement and the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, in cooperation with federal agency Centers for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, will partner with diverse faith communities to organize a week of action devoted to forming or expanding and showcasing multi-faith partnerships aimed at countering antisemitism and other forms of hate. (By November 2023)

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.51

The UK Government should reconvene the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism, with all relevant government departments attending: Home Office, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Foreign Office, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Department for Education, the Department for Justice, the Cabinet Office, and others on an ad-hoc basis. The key Jewish representative bodies that previously sat on this group, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Jewish Leadership Council and the Community Security Trust are key partners and should be the permanent representatives of the community throughout this Parliament.

United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4

The objectives of the five action areas are all interconnected, concern society as a whole, and can only be achieved in concert. It is therefore hoped that many will use this National Strategy in their efforts to fight antisemitism.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.45

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.125 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.10 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.24 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.33 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.21 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.7 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.5 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.26 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.13 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The Lange test requires proportionality. Conditioning research funding on retrospective political compliance assessment burdens freedom of political communication without clear justification proportionate to that burden. Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43 established that the implied freedom protects 'the free expression of political opinion, including through peaceful protest.' Research and scholarship on contested political topics — Israel/Palestine, refugee policy, Indigenous rights — is political communication in the constitutional sense. Conditioning it on ideological compliance does not survive structured proportionality review.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

FUNDING[CONTESTED]

The Envoy will advocate to continue to have the appropriate authorities investigate sources of overseas funding entering public institutions, including universities, which might drive extreme ideologies. (See 3.4 regarding a commission of inquiry.)

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.9

ⓘ The peer evidence does not provide clear support or opposition to the Segal recommendation, with various countries addressing different aspects of funding and extremism without a consistent approach.17 countries

DHS will, within its existing authorities, continue to take steps to improve access to publicly available resources to historically underserved community applicants of the NSGP, to increase equity in the application process. For example, DHS will approach Jewish communities that have not applied for NSGP funding to ensure they understand the benefits of the NSGP and the process for applying for such funding. DHS will partner with other departments and agencies with resources and authorities to provide such assistance, ensuring those agencies receive adequate information on DHS training and resources.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.28

The Commission will therefore take the fight against antisemitism systematically into consideration when developing policies, legislation and funding programmes, and aims to enhance active cooperation with Member States on mainstreaming tools and practices in the fight against discrimination and antisemitism.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.8

The general public should be made aware of funding opportunities, materials, and successful projects. In addition, education and prevention projects should include intersectional and interrelational perspectives so that links between antisemitism, misogyny, and racism can be addressed.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.26

Measure 1: Continue funding for Jewish Pathfinders and other information measures. Responsible: Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development

Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.23

Update the agenda of the Coordination Centre established by the Ministry of the Interior; continue to provide funding for security measures for Jewish organizations.

Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.18

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.54 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.33 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.157 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.16 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.7 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.43 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.21 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.21 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.17 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4

Court case: Constitutional Context

The Lange test requires proportionality. Conditioning research funding on retrospective political compliance assessment burdens freedom of political communication without clear justification proportionate to that burden. Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43 established that the implied freedom protects 'the free expression of political opinion, including through peaceful protest.' Research and scholarship on contested political topics — Israel/Palestine, refugee policy, Indigenous rights — is political communication in the constitutional sense. Conditioning it on ideological compliance does not survive structured proportionality review.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

SECURITY[CONTESTED]

Universities must ensure they adopt an effective definition of antisemitism for practical application on campus, including integration into codes of conduct. They must also report transparently on complaints and disciplinary actions.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.11

Analytical note — why this recommendation is contested. This recommendation is contested not because of the principle of clear definitional standards — that is broadly supported across peer jurisdictions (see Further references below) — but because it does not specify which definition universities must adopt. The Segal Plan consistently promotes the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism. However, the IHRA definition and its application to university campuses is itself the subject of live contestation at this Royal Commission and in academic literature.

The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA), signed by over 370 international scholars, was released precisely because its authors — including former IHRA National Representatives — judged the IHRA definition inadequate for academic contexts: too imprecise to provide the practical guidance this recommendation demands, and liable to capture legitimate political expression as antisemitic. Section C of the JDA (guidelines 11–15) provides explicit examples of speech that is not antisemitic — safeguards that the IHRA text omits entirely. A mandate to embed an unspecified definition in codes of conduct, without those safeguards, is one that peer institutions in the United Kingdom, Norway, and across Continental Europe have declined to implement. The extended discussion of IHRA and JDA, including the evidence before this Commission, appears in the contextual note to Recommendation 1 of this submission.

ⓘ The peer evidence is split, with only a few countries having similar provisions, indicating reasonable positions exist on both sides.17 countries

We call on Congress to fully fund the President’s FY24 Budget request of $177.6 million for ED OCR. This is a $37.6 million increase from the 2023 enacted level of $140 million. The additional requested funds would strengthen OCR’s work to counter antisemitism and related forms of discrimination in K-12 schools and on campus.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.41

The Commission will: Support the exchange through the European Integration Network of good practices on informing migrants on EU values, including on combating antisemitism, for example by working with migrants as ambassadors for EU values.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.19

The Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration funds projects to fight antisemitism by fostering Jewish-Muslim dialogue: this project (“Schalom Aleikum Jüdisch-Muslimischer Dialog”) of the Central Council of Jews in Germany has received funding under the auspices of the national program to prevent Islamist extremism (NPP) since 2019. In 2022, the dialogue project was expanded into the “Denkfabrik Schalom Aleikum,” a think tank that will also include Christian participants.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.28

Extension of the integration declaration for asylum seekers and those granted subsidiary protection by adding a statement or passage on antisemitism

Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.139

Award national fellowships for thematic works dedicated to the fight against discrimination, intolerance, hate speech and antisemitism, including taking into account the Holocaust Research Fund Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski” and universities active in the field Bulgarian Academy of Science

Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.21

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.54 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.33 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.16 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.7 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.43 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.21 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.17 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.24 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4

Court case: Constitutional Context

The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down laws used to suppress protests about Israeli state conduct. A surveillance infrastructure that monitors online political speech about Israel/Palestine — and investigates 'overseas funding' for ideological positions — must satisfy the Lange proportionality test. The political context of the NSWCA case — protest suppression in the context of the same political conflict the Segal Plan addresses — is directly relevant to whether such surveillance would be applied in a viewpoint-neutral manner.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

SECURITY[OVERSTATED]

All members of the university community – including staff, students, and visitors – who promote antisemitic rhetoric or harass Jewish students or academics must be held accountable.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.11

Analytical note. Where conduct is unlawful — harassment, incitement, criminal intimidation — the existing criminal law provides the mechanism for accountability, and it is for police and prosecutors to act. The Segal Plan's novel contribution is to extend the accountability mechanism into university disciplinary systems for conduct that may not meet the criminal threshold. That extension is Track 2 of the dual-track enforcement architecture described in Section 3.3 of this submission: universities that fail to discipline such conduct face funding conditionality applied by the Envoy. The word "must" in this recommendation is not aspirational — it is a compliance requirement enforced through funding. The peer evidence (below) shows that no comparator jurisdiction imposes mandatory institutional disciplinary obligations of this kind backed by a funding sanction; peer strategies use encouragement, codes of best practice, and criminal law referral — not administrative compulsion.

ⓘ Australia goes significantly further than the international median; fewer than 25% of peers have an equivalent provision.17 countries

We call on academic and other research institutions to create forums for Jewish and non-Jewish community leaders and K-12 teachers to partner with academics on educational resources that teach about antisemitism and other forms of hate.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.22

• Support, also financially, the creation of a network of Holocaust sites ‘where the Holocaust happened’ - from synagogues to Jewish cultural sites, hiding places to shooting grounds – are often not visible. This can include a network enabling school students, practitioners and the general public to trace the continuity of Jewish presence in Europe over the centuries.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.43

The government has allocated 1.3 million for this purpose. The establishment of the Security Fund aligns with the Jetten et al. motion, which calls on the government to cover the additional costs incurred by the Jewish community for securing institutions and properties.

Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.1

Promote that civil society organizations request aid within the annual grant line promoted by the State Secretariat for Migration and among whose objectives can be included combating antisemitic hate speech, misinformation, and online conspiracy theories in Spanish.

Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.28

An annual grant of DKK 300,000 is provided to the Jewish Community’s Department for Mapping and Knowledge Sharing of Anti-Semitic Incidents (AKVAH) to strengthen existing monitoring of anti-Semitic incidents, including those on the Internet, as well as to support and guide people who have been exposed to an anti-Semitic incident.

Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.10

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.54 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.157 - Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.28 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.7 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.43 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.21 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.24 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4

Court case: Constitutional Context

The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down laws used to suppress protests about Israeli state conduct. A surveillance infrastructure that monitors online political speech about Israel/Palestine — and investigates 'overseas funding' for ideological positions — must satisfy the Lange proportionality test. The political context of the NSWCA case — protest suppression in the context of the same political conflict the Segal Plan addresses — is directly relevant to whether such surveillance would be applied in a viewpoint-neutral manner.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

SECURITY[OVERSTATED]

If significant problems remain at universities by the start of the 2026 academic year, as assessed by the Envoy’s report card, a dedicated judicial inquiry should be undertaken to address systemic issues, including the investigation of foreign sources of funding for antisemitic activities and academics at universities.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.11

ⓘ Australia's recommendation for a dedicated judicial inquiry is more extensive than the measures proposed in the peer evidence, which focus on cooperation, funding for hate crime programs, and addressing online extremism.17 countries

Eight agencies—USDA, DOL, HHS, HUD, DHS, DOI, DOT, and Treasury—will produce fact sheets explaining that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based on shared ancestry or ethnic characteristics, including certain forms of antisemitic, Islamophobic, and related forms of discrimination and bias, in federally funded programs and activities. This will be the first time these agencies have recognized in writing that Title VI prohibits such forms of discrimination in their federally funded programs and activities. (By September 2023)

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.43

The Home Office should bring forward an inflation-linked multi-year funding agreement for the Protective Security Grant to support the CST with a proven track-record for helping Jewish communities to feel safe.

United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4

This guide is intended to help schools and teachers recognize, deal with and report antisemitic incidents. It includes references to educational resources and training courses for professionals that help to ensure that proper action is taken when antisemitic incidents occur.

Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.17

During the revision of the standard contracts of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), it will be clarified that incitement activities, such as antisemitism, can lead to the termination of funding agreements by the ADA.

Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.193

Award national fellowships for thematic works dedicated to the fight against discrimination, intolerance, hate speech and antisemitism, including taking into account the Holocaust Research Fund Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski” and universities active in the field Bulgarian Academy of Science

Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.21

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.54 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.33 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.16 - Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.28 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.28 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.22 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.7 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.43 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.24

Court case: Constitutional Context

The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down laws used to suppress protests about Israeli state conduct. A surveillance infrastructure that monitors online political speech about Israel/Palestine — and investigates 'overseas funding' for ideological positions — must satisfy the Lange proportionality test. The political context of the NSWCA case — protest suppression in the context of the same political conflict the Segal Plan addresses — is directly relevant to whether such surveillance would be applied in a viewpoint-neutral manner.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

COMMUNITY[OVERSTATED]

Include terms in all public funding agreements with cultural institutions or festivals to allow for the efficient termination of funding where the institution or festival promotes, facilitates or does not deal effectively with hate or antisemitism.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.12

ⓘ Australia's recommendation is more stringent than the international median, as fewer than 25% of peers have an equivalent provision focusing on terminating funding for hate or antisemitism.17 countries

We call on state, local, and private cultural institutions to highlight Jewish American heritage, culture, identity and history as well as histories of antisemitism in cultural festivals and institutions. The Smithsonian will highlight histories of American Jews and Judaism at the upcoming Summer 2023 Folklife Festival on the National Mall, in the program Creative Encounters: Living Religions in the U.S. The Smithsonian will continue to offer exhibitions, experiences, and resources that teach the heritage, histories, identities, and cultures of Jewish Americans, including episodes of antisemitism, and Judaism as a religion.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.20

The general public should be made aware of funding opportunities, materials, and successful projects. In addition, education and prevention projects should include intersectional and interrelational perspectives so that links between antisemitism, misogyny, and racism can be addressed.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.26

During the revision of the standard contracts of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), it will be clarified that incitement activities, such as antisemitism, can lead to the termination of funding agreements by the ADA.

Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.193

• Support, also financially, the creation of a network of Holocaust sites ‘where the Holocaust happened’ - from synagogues to Jewish cultural sites, hiding places to shooting grounds – are often not visible. This can include a network enabling school students, practitioners and the general public to trace the continuity of Jewish presence in Europe over the centuries.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.43

Support measures to combat antisemitism and safeguard Jewish cultural heritage within the framework of new EEA funding

Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.1

Further references addressing this category: - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.54 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.33 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.16 - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.17 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.7 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.43 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.21 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.21 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.17 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.24 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4

Court case: Constitutional Context

The NSWCA ruling of 16 April 2026 struck down laws used to suppress protests about Israeli state conduct. A surveillance infrastructure that monitors online political speech about Israel/Palestine — and investigates 'overseas funding' for ideological positions — must satisfy the Lange proportionality test. The political context of the NSWCA case — protest suppression in the context of the same political conflict the Segal Plan addresses — is directly relevant to whether such surveillance would be applied in a viewpoint-neutral manner.

Burden-justification framework. If a law effectively burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters, it is invalid unless it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567

Lange two-step test for implied freedom. A law will be valid if: (1) the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of government; and (2) it does no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose in a way that is compatible with the constitutional system.

Unanimous Court, Lange v ABC (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567-568

LEGISLATION[OVERSTATED]

The Envoy will advocate to government to: • Screen visa applicants for antisemitic views or affiliations, consistent with a risk-based approach. • Ensure the Migration Act (and associated decision-making and review processes) effectively facilitates visa refusals or cancellations for antisemitic conduct and rhetoric.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.13

ⓘ Australia's recommendation to screen visa applicants for antisemitic views or affiliations is more extensive than the measures taken by most peers, as evidenced by the lack of similar provisions in the provided international examples.25 countries

DOD will conduct a review of existing training to identify any gaps in coverage of antisemitic and Islamophobic conduct as a form of prohibited discrimination. (By November 2023)

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.44

The Federal Government collaborates with civil society to maintain a consistent approach both domestically and internationally in combating antisemitism and promoting Jewish life.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.1

Based on the 'Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia'66, in 2016 the European Commission agreed with the largest social media platforms and companies a Conduct Code (Code of Conduct)67 to prevent and combat the spread of illegal online hate speech in Europe. This requires platforms to quickly review and remove reported illegal hate speech.

Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.120

The Commission will continue to monitor reliable and comparable data on antisemitic incidents, as these are crucial for assessing the spread of antisemitism in Europe and tackling it effectively.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.10

As part of the implementation of the Online Safety Act 2023, the UK Government must work with online platforms to eradicate antisemitism online and hold those accountable who knowingly fail to block their systems from promoting it.

United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.17

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.39 - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.33 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.29 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.12 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.35 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.4 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.5 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The HC challenge in White Australia Party Inc v Commonwealth [2026] HCASJ 17 is proceeding to a Full Court hearing in September 2026. On 4 June 2026, Gageler CJ dismissed the plaintiffs' interlocutory application for injunctive relief; the Commonwealth did not contest the existence of a serious question to be determined on the implied freedom of political communication. The plaintiffs rely on Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5 — where a 6:1 majority struck down the Communist Party Dissolution Act on the ground that Parliament cannot dissolve a political organisation by legislative declaration. The Full Court hearing will determine whether the Segal Plan's enacted legislative architecture survives constitutional review.

Judicial review of proscription — Parliament cannot self-validate. The characterisation of a body as dangerous to the security of the Commonwealth cannot be made by Parliament itself so as to place it beyond judicial review. The characterisation of facts upon which the Parliament purports to act is a matter for judicial determination.

Composite summary of majority reasoning, (1951) 83 CLR 1

Dixon J — Constitution and rule of law. The Constitution is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, as, for example, in separating the judicial power from other functions of government, to some of which it does not. Among those to which it gives effect is the rule of law.

Dixon J, Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193

LEGISLATION[OVERSTATED]

Screen visa applicants for antisemitic views or affiliations, consistent with a risk-based approach.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.13

ⓘ Australia's recommendation to screen visa applicants for antisemitic views or affiliations is more stringent than the international median, as evidenced by the lack of similar provisions in the peer countries provided.25 countries

DHS will, within its existing authorities, continue to take steps to improve access to publicly available resources to historically underserved community applicants of the NSGP, to increase equity in the application process. For example, DHS will approach Jewish communities that have not applied for NSGP funding to ensure they understand the benefits of the NSGP and the process for applying for such funding. DHS will partner with other departments and agencies with resources and authorities to provide such assistance, ensuring those agencies receive adequate information on DHS training and resources.

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.28

RIAS aims to ensure consistent recording and documentation of antisemitic incidents by civil society across Germany through collaboration with civil society organizations, local counseling and monitoring structures, and certain state criminal police offices.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.27

The NAS 2.0 will be carried out in the area of integration through a variety of measures, whose goal is to prevent and counteract antisemitic attitudes in migrant environments primarily through consistent value communication, as well as simultaneously strengthening awareness of the historical and societal contributions of Judaism.

Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.138

Produce a periodic report on the monitoring and combating of antisemitism. This will be further reinforced through actions intended to obtain: − the breakdown ‘by areas’ of data on hate crimes and, therefore, specific evidence of cases with the presence of antisemitic discriminatory purposes; − the continuation of interforce data collection already initiated by OSCAD in 2019 based on OSCE indicators, in order to set up over time a single system for the registration of antisemitic crimes; − the optimisation of systems for exchanging data between OSCAD, UCEI, CDEC and Jewish communities active since 2019, in order to share not only cases constituting crimes but also episodes (relating to both the real and virtual world) which, although they do not rise to the level of crimes, require close monitoring due to the concrete risk of escalation to more serious acts or ‘hate incidents’.

Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.27

Further references addressing this category: - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.39 - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.33 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.29 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.12 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.35 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.4 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.43 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.5 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The HC challenge in White Australia Party Inc v Commonwealth [2026] HCASJ 17 is proceeding to a Full Court hearing in September 2026. On 4 June 2026, Gageler CJ dismissed the plaintiffs' interlocutory application for injunctive relief; the Commonwealth did not contest the existence of a serious question to be determined on the implied freedom of political communication. The plaintiffs rely on Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5 — where a 6:1 majority struck down the Communist Party Dissolution Act on the ground that Parliament cannot dissolve a political organisation by legislative declaration. The Full Court hearing will determine whether the Segal Plan's enacted legislative architecture survives constitutional review.

Judicial review of proscription — Parliament cannot self-validate. The characterisation of a body as dangerous to the security of the Commonwealth cannot be made by Parliament itself so as to place it beyond judicial review. The characterisation of facts upon which the Parliament purports to act is a matter for judicial determination.

Composite summary of majority reasoning, (1951) 83 CLR 1

Dixon J — Constitution and rule of law. The Constitution is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, as, for example, in separating the judicial power from other functions of government, to some of which it does not. Among those to which it gives effect is the rule of law.

Dixon J, Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193

LEGISLATION[OVERSTATED]

Ensure the Migration Act (and associated decision-making and review processes) effectively facilitates visa refusals or cancellations for antisemitic conduct and rhetoric.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.13

ⓘ Only the Czech Republic and Slovakia mention hate crimes in a similar context, while other countries focus on broader human rights protection or cooperation, indicating Australia goes significantly further.25 countries

DOD will conduct a review of existing training to identify any gaps in coverage of antisemitic and Islamophobic conduct as a form of prohibited discrimination. (By November 2023)

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.44

Based on the 'Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia'66, in 2016 the European Commission agreed with the largest social media platforms and companies a Conduct Code (Code of Conduct)67 to prevent and combat the spread of illegal online hate speech in Europe. This requires platforms to quickly review and remove reported illegal hate speech.

Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.120

The Commission will continue to monitor reliable and comparable data on antisemitic incidents, as these are crucial for assessing the spread of antisemitism in Europe and tackling it effectively.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.10

The Network Enforcement Act requires providers to offer a user-friendly procedure for reporting certain kinds of punishable content (such as insults and antisemitic incitement) and to determine whether the reported content constitutes a crime. They are required to remove unlawful content within 24 hours or seven days.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.16

The DSA also facilitates addressing social risks online, such as the rapid dissemination of illegal antisemitic messages.

Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.24

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.39 - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.33 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.29 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.12 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.35 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.4 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.14 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.5 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The HC challenge in White Australia Party Inc v Commonwealth [2026] HCASJ 17 is proceeding to a Full Court hearing in September 2026. On 4 June 2026, Gageler CJ dismissed the plaintiffs' interlocutory application for injunctive relief; the Commonwealth did not contest the existence of a serious question to be determined on the implied freedom of political communication. The plaintiffs rely on Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5 — where a 6:1 majority struck down the Communist Party Dissolution Act on the ground that Parliament cannot dissolve a political organisation by legislative declaration. The Full Court hearing will determine whether the Segal Plan's enacted legislative architecture survives constitutional review.

Judicial review of proscription — Parliament cannot self-validate. The characterisation of a body as dangerous to the security of the Commonwealth cannot be made by Parliament itself so as to place it beyond judicial review. The characterisation of facts upon which the Parliament purports to act is a matter for judicial determination.

Composite summary of majority reasoning, (1951) 83 CLR 1

Dixon J — Constitution and rule of law. The Constitution is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, as, for example, in separating the judicial power from other functions of government, to some of which it does not. Among those to which it gives effect is the rule of law.

Dixon J, Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193

LEGISLATION[OVERSTATED]

Provide antisemitism training to staff within the Department of Home Affairs and all those involved in processing visa applications.

Australia, Special Envoy's Plan to Combat Antisemitism (the 'Segal Plan') (2025), p.13

ⓘ Australia's recommendation is more specific than the international peers, which focus on broader human rights and cooperation rather than targeted antisemitism training.25 countries

The UK Government should reconvene the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism, with all relevant government departments attending: Home Office, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Foreign Office, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Department for Education, the Department for Justice, the Cabinet Office, and others on an ad-hoc basis. The key Jewish representative bodies that previously sat on this group, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Jewish Leadership Council and the Community Security Trust are key partners and should be the permanent representatives of the community throughout this Parliament.

United Kingdom — United Kingdom, HM Government's Independent Adviser on Antisemitism: End of Term Report (Lord Mann) (2024), p.4

Organize an obligatory training day for all teachers and school staff on the issues of racism, antisemitism, antiziganism, and discrimination.

France — France, Plan national de lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et les discriminations liees a l'origine 2023-2026 (2023), p.6

The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s (SAMHSA) National Child Traumatic Stress Network will continue to provide resources on how to talk with children and youth about hate crimes and identity-based violence. This includes guidance on talking with children about the painful consequences of antisemitism and other forms of hate, as well as strategies for coping with the associated trauma and fear. (Ongoing)

United States — United States, The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism (2023), p.32

Support educational professionals’ training in cooperation with UNESCO and OSCE-ODIHR, based on their guidance on ‘Addressing antisemitism through education’, respectively for policymakers and teacher-training institutions.

European Union — European Union, EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) (2021), p.22

Hamburg created a professorship to offer a Jewish perspective for student training from the Center for Critical Education on Antisemitism at the University of Würzburg.

Germany — Germany, Nationale Strategie der Bundesregierung gegen Antisemitismus und fuer juedisches Leben (NASAS) (2022), p.31

Further references addressing this category: - Italy — Italy, Strategia Nazionale per la lotta contro l'antisemitismo (2025 edition) (2025), p.30 - Ireland — Ireland, National Action Plan Against Racism 2023-2027 (2023), p.39 - Croatia — Croatia, National Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Combatting Discrimination to 2027 (2022), p.21 - Czech Republic — Czech Republic, Strategy for combating antisemitism for 2025-2030 (2024), p.19 - Slovakia — Slovakia, The Conceptual Framework for Countering Radicalisation and Extremism by 2024 (2021), p.10 - Spain — Spain, Plan Nacional para la Implementacion de la Estrategia Europea de Lucha contra el Antisemitismo 2023-2030 (2023), p.42 - Austria — Austria, Nationale Strategie gegen Antisemitismus 2.0 (2025), p.125 - United Nations — United Nations, United Nations Action Plan to Enhance Monitoring and Response to Antisemitism (2025), p.10 - Hungary — Hungary, Magyarorszag antiszemitizmus elleni nemzeti strategiaja (National Strategy Against Antisemitism) (2024), p.33 - Luxembourg — Luxembourg, Plan d'action national de lutte contre l'antisemitisme (PANAS) (2023), p.5 - Norway — Norway, Action plan against antisemitism 2025-2030 (2024), p.29 - Latvia — Latvia, Action Plan for the Reduction of Racism and Antisemitism for 2023 (2023), p.12 - Denmark — Denmark, Handlingsplan mod antisemitisme 2026-2029 (2026), p.14 - Belgium — Belgium, Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (NAPAR) - Federale maatregelen 2021-2024 (2022), p.35 - Bulgaria — Bulgaria, National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism (2023-2027) (2023), p.4 - Sweden — Sweden, Action programme to combat antisemitism (2022), p.7 - Netherlands — Netherlands, Strategie Bestrijding Antisemitisme 2024-2030 (2024), p.32 - Slovenia — Slovenia, Strategija Republike Slovenije za boj proti antisemitizmu do leta 2033 (2023-2033) (2023), p.9 - Switzerland — Switzerland, Nationale Strategie gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2026-2031 (2025), p.5 - OSCE / ODIHR — OSCE / ODIHR, Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide (2017), p.1

Court case: Constitutional Context

The HC challenge in White Australia Party Inc v Commonwealth [2026] HCASJ 17 is proceeding to a Full Court hearing in September 2026. On 4 June 2026, Gageler CJ dismissed the plaintiffs' interlocutory application for injunctive relief; the Commonwealth did not contest the existence of a serious question to be determined on the implied freedom of political communication. The plaintiffs rely on Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5 — where a 6:1 majority struck down the Communist Party Dissolution Act on the ground that Parliament cannot dissolve a political organisation by legislative declaration. The Full Court hearing will determine whether the Segal Plan's enacted legislative architecture survives constitutional review.

Judicial review of proscription — Parliament cannot self-validate. The characterisation of a body as dangerous to the security of the Commonwealth cannot be made by Parliament itself so as to place it beyond judicial review. The characterisation of facts upon which the Parliament purports to act is a matter for judicial determination.

Composite summary of majority reasoning, (1951) 83 CLR 1

Dixon J — Constitution and rule of law. The Constitution is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, as, for example, in separating the judicial power from other functions of government, to some of which it does not. Among those to which it gives effect is the rule of law.

Dixon J, Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193

Correction Register

Corrections applied 2026-08-23. Each entry corresponds to a ⟦marker⟧ in the text above. Struck-through text is as originally lodged.

Quotation absent from the cited source document (3)

Quotation whose wording differs from the source (16)

Paraphrase presented as a verbatim quotation (3)

Machine translation presented as a verbatim quotation (2)

Claim broader than the evidence supports (8)

Incorrect figure or count (25)

Incorrect page or legal citation (25)

Passage withdrawn on review (5)